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Two Essays on Venture Capital: What Drives the Underpricing of Venture Capital-
backed IPOs and Do Venture Capitalists Provide Anything More than Money? 
 
Donald Flagg 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation includes two chapters that investigate the role venture capitalists 
(VCs) play in the underpricing and in the long-run performance of IPOs.  The first 
chapter focuses on the underpricing of IPOs and attempts to determine the role that VCs 
play in this underpricing process.  The evidence is consistent with a view that VCs agree 
to underpricing to ascertain benefits from both grandstanding and spinning.  The 
second chapter examines the long-run performance of IPOs and tries to determine the 
role that VCs play in the development of IPOs.  Here, the evidence suggests that VC-
backed IPOs appear to have better access to capital than non-VC-backed IPOs, but the 
long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs is generally mixed.   
  1
Essay 1 
 
What Drives the Underpricing of Venture Capital-backed IPOs? 
I. Introduction 
Researchers of initial public offerings (IPOs), generally attribute the underpricing 
of IPOs to the existence of informational asymmetries between initial shareholders (of the 
private firm) and first-day investors.  They view the abnormal initial (first-day) return or 
underpricing as a discount to investors who are, on average, less informed about the 
firms quality than insiders (Rock, 1986).  Venture Capitalists (VCs) are supposed to 
reduce the amount of asymmetric information between private firms and their first-day 
investors.  Therefore, underpricing of private firms IPOs should be reduced when VCs 
have equity stakes in the firms.   
Early work in this area supports the intuitive notion that VCs reduce underpricing.  
Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) in their pioneering work, suggest that 
VCs monitor private firms in which they take an equity stake and reduce the asymmetric 
information between investors and insiders of private firms.  Superior monitoring leads to 
a reduction in underpricing, which is significantly lower for venture backed IPOs than for 
non-venture backed IPOs.    In a similar vein, Megginson and Weiss (1991) suggest that 
VCs serve to certify the value of the private firm and reduce underpricing for these 
private firms going public.  VCs achieve this by holding high equity stakes in the private 
firms and remaining on the board of directors after the IPO. 
In contrast, a recent paper, by Lee and Wahal (2004), has provided evidence of an 
opposite relationship with venture backed IPOs having higher underpricing than non-
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venture backed IPOs.  The sample data used in this paper supports their empirical 
finding, showing venture backed IPOs with an average unadjusted underpricing of 14.7 
percentage points greater than non-venture backed counterparts.1  The evidence of Lee 
and Wahal and this study contradicts the prevailing view of earlier studies that 
documented a negative relationship between VCs and underpricing.  To date the only 
explanation provided for this seemingly counterintuitive result of the newer studies is the 
grandstanding theory proposed by Gompers (1996).  This paper questions if 
grandstanding is the only reason for the underpricing difference found between VC-
backed and non-VC-backed IPOs.  It investigates the underpricing discrepancy between 
the two IPO types and attempts to reconcile the contradicting results.  This paper finds 
empirical support for two potential incentive conflicts that exist between VCs and private 
firms, which are spinning and grandstanding.  The results of this paper show that these 
two incentive conflicts appear to be the cause of greater underpricing for venture backed 
IPOs.  After controlling for grandstanding and spinning, VC funding is found to be 
negatively correlated with underpricing, supporting the idea that in the absence of 
incentive conflicts VCs reduce underpricing.   
Gompers (1996) grandstanding theory illustrates a potential conflict that may 
arise between VCs and private firms.  The grandstanding theory argues that VCs wanting 
to establish themselves quickly will bring private firms public sooner in order to entice 
future funding from VC investors.  The idea behind this theory is that a less than well 
                                                
1 The positive differential simply looks at the average difference in underpricing of both types of IPOs.  It 
is expected that venture backed IPOs might have a greater underpricing differential as compared to non-
venture backed IPOs because of the risk characteristics of firms going public under each type.  After 
controlling for time, industry, and risk factors venture backed IPOs still have a significant 3.2 percentage 
points more underpricing than their non-venture counterparts. 
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established VC will attempt to build its reputation through successful IPOs and secure 
future funding.  Such VCs, eager to build their reputation, will rapidly bring private firms 
public to prove to prospective clients their ability to do so.  However, rushing private 
firms public increases the amount of underpricing associated with the issues as younger 
firms are less established and riskier than their older counterparts.  Gompers (1996) finds 
evidence that supports this notion by showing a lower average age and higher 
underpricing for private firms taken public by younger VCs as compared to older VCs.  
Gompers also shows that underpricing in venture backed IPOs is positively correlated 
with future funding from private investors.  While VCs appear to benefit from it, 
grandstanding poses a real cost to non-VC shareholders of the private firm because of 
higher underpricing.    
With underpricing increasing over time and simply exploding during the bubble 
period, a new type of incentive conflict has arisen.  Loughran and Ritter (2004) point out 
this conflict in their spinning hypothesis.  Specifically, the spinning hypothesis states 
that the decision makers of an IPO (VCs or the CEO of a private firm) will strike a deal 
with underwriters to deliberately underprice the offering in order to receive future 
allocations of hot IPOs.  Loughran and Ritter (2004) make no distinction on which of 
the two decision makers will take more advantage of spinning.  In this paper, we 
hypothesize that VC managers are more able to take advantage of spinning than CEOs of 
private firms.   
There are two reasons why VCs take greater advantage of spinning.   First, VC 
managers (the decision maker for venture backed IPOs) do not sell a large portion of their 
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ownership of shares during the IPO.  Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) show that the decision 
makers of IPOs only care about underpricing to the extent to which they stand to lose 
from it.  VC managers do not suffer much from high underpricing but can personally 
benefit from favorable future allocations of IPOs.  Second, VC managers have multiple 
dealings with underwriters, which provide them with an enforcement mechanism for the 
quid pro quo arrangement.2  Evidence of this spinning behavior between VCs and 
investment banks is reported in the Wall Street Journal article, Something Ventured, 
Something Gained (2002).  This article alleged how some investment banks would 
(preferentially) allocate shares of highly underpriced IPOs to VC managers in exchange 
for greater underpricing in the VCs own portfolio firm.3      
This paper examines the underpricing differential between venture-backed and 
non-venture-backed IPOs.  In particular, it attempts to explain why venture-backed IPOs 
have higher underpricing than non-venture-backed IPOs after controlling for various 
measures of risk.  In the sample period used for this paper, the difference in underpricing 
is shown to be a significant 3.2 percentage points more for venture-backed IPOs than non 
venture-backed IPOs after controlling for various measures of risk.  This difference is 
economically important because 3.2 percentage points equals an average of about $1.5 
million dollars left on the table per IPO as compared to an average offer size of about $46 
million.  That is, private firms that obtain venture funding suffer from additional 
                                                
2 It would seem that venture capitalists have the largest incentive to make deals with investment firms 
because they have repeated trips to the IPO market.  Through repeated trips to the IPO market a venture 
capital firm could trade a high amount of rents with an investment firm and benefit greatly through a 
mutual beneficial relationship.  Also the multiple dealings allow VCs to enforce the underwriters end of 
the quid-pro-quo agreement.    
3 This article alleged that Goldman Sachs may have traded favorable allocations of IPOs in return for 
higher underpricing in the portfolio companies held by venture firms, namely Benchmark.  
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underpricing of about $1.5 million on average when their firm goes public compared to 
IPOs that are not backed by venture capital.           
As mentioned, one explanation for this 3.2 percentage point difference in 
underpricing is grandstanding by less well-known VCs (Lee and Wahal, 2004).  It is hard 
to believe that only such VCs which typically have fewer and smaller deals than well-
known VCs are moving the market enough to provide a 3.2 percentage point underpricing 
differential over a 20-year time period.  Lee and Wahal (2004) support the notion of 
grandstanding through capital flow regressions, but they neither directly test the 
underpricing effect of grandstanding, nor test another potential conflict, spinning, by 
VCs.  This paper builds on the work of Lee and Wahal (2004) by measuring the effect of 
grandstanding and spinning and examining how both incentive conflicts affect the 
underpricing differential between venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs. The 
results suggest that the degree of grandstanding and spinning between private firms and 
VCs is positively and significantly related to underpricing.  In particular, this paper finds 
that both spinning and grandstanding play an important role in the underpricing 
differential between venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs.   
This paper also extends the work of Loughran and Ritter (2004) by separating the 
two decision makers of IPOs, showing that VCs as decision makers increase 
underpricing.  In addition, it illustrates that venture funding is negatively related to 
underpricing after controlling for the two aforementioned incentive conflicts.  The paper 
supports the idea that VCs can (in the absence of potential conflicts) reduce the amount 
of asymmetric information in private firms through better monitoring or certification of 
  6
value.  The evidence reconciles the difference between the earlier findings on VCs and 
the recent study by Lee and Wahal (2004).  This paper also reconciles its results with that 
of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) by demonstrating that venture fund managers increase 
underpricing even after controlling for their ownership of the private firm.   
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the related 
literature and shows how incentives can lead to higher or lower underpricing by VCs.  
Section 3 describes the data used in this study.  Section 4 reviews and analyzes the 
variables used in the regressions.  Section 5 discusses the results and their implications to 
grandstanding as well as to spinning.  Section 6 revisits the spinning hypothesis and 
provides a robustness check to the spinning hypothesis.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Related Literature  
2.1 Beneficial Roles of Venture Capitalists  
2.1.1 Monitoring 
Venture capitalists equity stake in a company sends a credible signal to the 
market that they will take an active role in monitoring the firm.  They do this by sitting 
on the board of director and working on financial goals with the company. While banks 
typically monitor the financial health and particularly the downside risk of the firm, 
venture capitalists tend to focus on strategic goals and investment decisions.  Barry, et al. 
(1990) examine this monitoring ability of VCs.  They hypothesize that VCs effective 
monitoring will decrease the amount of asymmetric information between investors and 
private firms, which in turn will lower underpricing.   
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Barry, et al. (1990) show on average that the lead venture capital firm holds a 19 
percent stake in the private firm, has one third of the board seats, and typically holds a 
high percentage of their shares well after the IPO date.  High stake in the private firm and 
board presence give VCs the incentive and ability to monitor their investment.  The 
monitoring theory suggests that investors should demand lower underpricing because an 
independent investor will monitor the firm closely, thereby reducing information 
asymmetries.  Barry, et al. (1990) also show that the higher the quality of the VC, the 
lower the underpricing.  The differences in abilities among VCs send information to 
investors about the quality of the monitor and in turn the quality of the IPO.  All else 
equal, investors should be willing to pay more for companies with VCs that are better at 
monitoring.    
Lerner (1995) extends this result by showing that venture capitalists increase 
monitoring during times of need.  Fama and Jensen (1983) and Williams (1983) 
hypothesize that the composition of the board should vary with the need for oversight.  
Lerner (1995) raises the question of whether the representation of VCs as members on 
their portfolio companies boards increases when the need for oversight is larger.  He 
finds that after a turnover in the CEO, the number of VC board members increases.  CEO 
turnover provides a good example for the need of oversight because it typically signifies 
potential trouble for the firm.  This evidence supports the monitoring theory that when 
there is an increased need for oversight, the intensity of monitoring increases.     
2.1.2 Certification 
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Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that VCs repeated trips to the IPO market 
enable them to certify firms with credibility because of reputation concerns.  In contrast, 
the managers of private firms typically take their own firms public only once in their 
lifetime. It would benefit them to conceal or delay negative information from reaching 
the public in order to increase the IPO offer price.  VCs cannot do this because it would 
impede their repeated trips to the capital market.  Thus, VCs are thought to provide a 
certification effect by reducing information asymmetries that arise between firms and 
the typical certifiers of IPOs, the investment banker and the auditors.  Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) show in a limited time period (1984-1987) that underpricing is less for VC-
backed IPOs and conclude that this is due to the certification effect.      
2.2 Potential Incentive conflicts between Venture Capitalists and Private Firms Other 
Shareholders   
2.2.1 Grandstanding 
Gompers (1996) argues that less well-known VCs may have the motivation to 
send a signal to the market of their ability or grandstand to build reputations.  Such 
VCs with low or unknown reputations will bring firms public sooner to establish a high 
quality reputation to help them raise capital in the market.4  Gompers (1996) found that 
the young VCs in his study consistently took firms public nearly two years faster than 
older VCs.  Rushing these firms to the market to gain a reputation does come at a 
significant cost, which is measured in a higher degree of underpricing and a lower 
percentage equity stake for the VC.  The VCs underprice offers to provide a good taste to 
                                                
4 High quality is defined as ability of a VC to pick a private firm that will eventually go public.  Going 
public is thought of as the most profitable exit strategy for VCs. 
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investors by providing a quick return and securing future investment.  It is much more 
important to these VCs to obtain future financing and extend their longevity than to 
maximize the price of the private firms going public.  This occurs, because many VCs are 
set up as partnerships with a finite life span of usually about 10 years.  If the VC firm, 
and more importantly the operators of the VC firm, are unable to show a track record of 
success, they may find it difficult to receive future funding to continue operations.   
Lee and Wahal (2004) challenge the certification hypothesis of venture backed 
IPOs.  In fact, they argue that the opposite is true; venture backed IPOs are underpriced 
more than non-venture backed IPOs.  They point out a major problem that the findings of 
previous studies are not robust over different time periods.  Lee and Wahal (2004) also 
address the inherently endogenous choice of VCs being able to choose the firms in which 
they will invest.  Their results show that, after using a propensity score matching 
approach to control for the endogeneity issue, venture backed firms exhibit a much higher 
degree of underpricing compared to non-venture backed firms.  The strength of their 
results is primarily driven by the bubble period in 1999 to 2000 when the underpricing 
difference is especially pronounced.   
Lee and Wahal (2004) offer the grandstanding hypothesis by Gompers (1996) as a 
reason for their results, pointing out that regressions show that commitments of capital 
are positively correlated to first-day returns.  One drawback to the matching technique 
used by Lee and Wahal (2004) is that it is impossible to tell which variables lead to the 
underpricing differential between venture backed and non-venture backed firms.  This 
paper overcomes this problem by using a switching regression approach to study the 
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magnitude and significance of grandstanding.  This approach uses a probit model to 
measure the determinants of venture funding and then uses the inverse Mills ratio as an 
independent variable in the OLS regression.     
2.2.2 Spinning Hypothesis 
Underpricing has increased over time and, with it, the door has swung open for a 
new type of incentive conflict.  The large increase in underpricing has led to some 
underwriters and VCs to extract rents through deliberate underpricing.  Loughran and 
Ritter (2002) talk about this occurrence and why private firm managers might not be 
upset about leaving money on the table (underpricing of IPOs).    Perhaps these managers 
are not upset because they are taking advantage of this rent tradeoff.  Specifically, the 
spinning hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) postulates that the decision makers of an 
IPO strike a deal with underwriters to underprice the offering in order to receive future 
allocations of hot IPOs.  The notion is that investment banks would (preferentially) 
allocate shares of other underpriced IPOs to VC managers in exchange for greater 
underpricing in the VCs own portfolio firm.  Loughran and Ritter (2002) show examples 
in which VCs were given allocations in hot IPOs and flipped them over for quick profits.   
This paper builds on this idea by dividing the decision makers into two groups, 
CEOs of private firms and VCs.  It is assumed that VCs are in a better position to take 
advantage of spinning.  The idea behind this is that each one of these decision makers is 
very different in nature.  The differences come in the form of shares sold, experience, and 
enforcement.  VCs have a low vested interest in the amount of underpricing due to fewer 
shares held in general and even less sold during the IPO, which increases their incentive 
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to spin.  VCs also understand the IPO process better and can enforce spinning agreements 
through their repeated trips to the IPO market.  CEOs lack the enforcement capability 
necessary to take full advantage of the spinning agreement.  With this in mind, this paper 
hypothesizes that VCs will take greater advantage of potential spinning and, as a result, 
VC-backed IPOs will have higher underpricing.        
    
3. Data 
The initial sample of IPOs comes from a database provided by Jay Ritter, which 
includes corrections made by him to the data extracted by a variety of sources, primarily 
SDC Platinum.  This data set includes the offer date, offer price, closing price, SIC code, 
perm number, underwriter ranking, and a dummy variable representing venture funding 
for all IPOs during the time period 1981-2000.  Underwriter ranks are based on the 
adjusted Carter-Manaster (1990) rankings used in Loughran and Ritter (2002).  The 
ranking system is between 0 and 9, with 9 representing the highest possible ranking, and 
0 the lowest.  Any underwriter with a rank of 8 or greater is considered a prestigious 
underwriter.  Unit offers and IPOs with an offer price under five dollars are not included.  
The dummy variable representing venture funding has been corrected in a few cases 
where venture funding existed but was not marked as a venture-backed firm.  IPOs that 
had a venture flag but no venture capital firm were eliminated from the sample.  
Problems with the SDC venture backing flag have been identified by Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003).   
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Information on the founding date of the firms included in the IPO sample was 
obtained from Jay Ritters Website.   This variable is from the Field-Ritter dataset of 
company founding dates, as used in Field and Karpoff (2002) and Loughran and Ritter 
(2004).  The founding date is used to obtain the age of the firm at the time of its IPO.  
Firm age is calculated as the IPO date minus the founding date.   
This dataset was supplemented with information from Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC), which includes state headquarters of the firm going public, net 
proceeds, IPO firm revenue, lead underwriter, and the names of the VCs that funded the 
private firm.  This information was merged with previously mentioned information to 
form the final sample.  The final sample includes 5,521 IPOs in the 20-year period 
between 1981 and 2000 that meet the above specifications.  From the sample of 5,521 
IPOs, 2,307 IPOs are backed by venture funding.       
4. Variables used in regressions 
 Table 1 explains all variables used in the regressions of this paper.  The first is a 
dummy variable signifying whether the IPO had venture funding.  A value of 1 denotes 
venture funding, whereas a value of 0 equals no venture funding.  The coefficient of this 
VC variable is expected to be positive as shown in previous research.5  This paper 
argues that the reason behind this positive coefficient is the aforementioned incentive 
conflicts.  This paper also argues that the VC coefficient will be negative after controlling 
for these incentive conflicts.  This coefficient demonstrates the benefits VCs provide to 
private firms in terms of underpricing in the absence of these incentive conflicts.   
                                                
5 Underpricing is shown to be greater for venture capital firms even after controlling for differences 
between the two groups.  This result is shown in Lee and Wahal (2004). 
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Table 1 
 
Variables Used in Regressions 
This table defines the different variables used in the regressions of this paper.  The only variables not 
included are industry and state headquarters dummy variables.  Industry dummy variables are created with 
2-digit SIC codes and state headquarters dummy uses each state as a dummy variable.    
Variables   Definitions 
 
1. VC A dummy variable signifying venture funding.  A value of 
1 represents venture funding and 0 does not. 
 
2. Log Proceeds  One plus the natural log of the net proceeds (in millions) 
for the firm issuing the IPO. 
 
3. Log Age The natural log of the firms age at the time of the IPO.  
Firm age is measured as IPO date  founding date. 
 
4. Prestigious UW Dummy variable given if the lead underwriter firm for the 
IPO has a rank of 8 or above. 
 
5. Log Revenue One plus the natural log of yearly revenue (in millions) for 
the IPO firm.   
 
6. 1990s Dummy variable given if the IPO took place in the time 
period between 1990-1998 
 
7. Bubble Dummy variable given if the IPO took place in the time 
period between 1999-2000 
 
8. Young Firm*VC Interaction term multiplying a young firm dummy (defined 
as any firm 4 years or younger) by a dummy for venture 
funding. 
 
9. Prestigious UW*VC Interaction term multiplying the prestigious underwriter 
dummy variable by the dummy for venture funding 
 
10. Share Overhang The ratio of shares retained in the IPO divided by the 
shares issued during the IPO. 
 
11. Log VC Money The highest amount one VC has invested in an IPO firm. 
 
12. Insider % Sold    The percentage of insider shares sold during the IPO.  
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Table 1 
 
Variables Used in Regressions (cont.) 
 
Variables   Definitions 
 
13. Relationship Dummy variable that measures whether the lead VC firm 
has a past relationship with the lead underwriter.  
 
14. Avg Under 3 deals  The average underpricing by an underwriter from its three 
most recent IPOs (average underpricing from t-1 through t-
3).  
 
15. Avg Under 5 deals The average underpricing by an underwriter from its five 
most recent IPOs (average underpricing from t-1 through t-
5). 
 
16. Under last deal   The underpricing by an underwriter from its last IPOs. 
 
17. Avg Under 3 deals*VC Interaction term multiplying the dummy variable for 
venture funding times the average underpricing by an 
underwriter its three most recent IPOs.   
 
18. Avg Under 5 deals*VC Interaction term multiplying the dummy variable for 
venture funding times the average underpricing by an 
underwriter its five most recent IPOs.   
 
19. Avg last deal*VC Interaction term multiplying the dummy variable for 
venture funding times the average underpricing by an 
underwriter its five most recent IPOs.   
 
 
 
 
 
Log proceeds measure the total dollar amount raised in the IPO.  Log age 
measures the age of the private firm at the time of the IPO.  This variable should capture 
the risk of the IPO as the younger firms will have more risk than their older counterparts.  
The prestigious underwriter dummy measures whether the IPO was underwritten by a 
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prestigious underwriter.  The coefficient of this dummy variable has two potential 
directions.  If a prestigious underwriter uses its reputation capital to certify the value of 
private firms, then it should have a negative coefficient.6  On the other hand, if 
prestigious underwriters take advantage of their market power to increase underpricing, 
the coefficient should be positive.7  Log revenue measures the IPO firms revenue and 
should have a negative coefficient, as higher firm revenue would equal lower firm risk.  
The 1990s time period dummy and the bubble time period dummy control for the time 
variation in underpricing and both coefficients should be positive, with the bubble period 
having the greater magnitude.                           
The next two variables attempt to measure the underpricing related to the 
grandstanding and spinning hypotheses.  The grandstanding variable used Young 
Firm*VC includes a dummy for private firms under the age of four years and is 
multiplied with the dummy variable used to mark firms with venture funding.  The age of 
four was determined based on the 25th percentile of age for venture backed IPOs.8  The 
logic behind the Young Firm*VC variable is as follows. An implication of the 
grandstanding hypothesis is that VC backed private companies will be taken public 
sooner than non-VC backed ones and will see greater underpricing.  The greater 
underpricing is due to two reasons.  First, younger IPO firms should have increased levels 
of uncertainty.  Second, VCs will rush public such firms prematurely and increase total 
                                                
6 Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Carter and Manaster (1990) find a negative relationship between prestigious 
underwriters and underpricing. 
7 Beatty and Welch (1996), Cooney, Singh, Carter and Dark (2001), and Loughran and Ritter (2004) find a 
positive relationship between prestigious underwriters and underpricing during the 1990s.  
8 The choice coincides with Gompers (1996).  He shows that the average age of private firms bought public 
by young venture capital firms is 55 months.  The purpose of the variable is to capture this grandstanding 
activity by venture capital firms.    
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underpricing as these firms are not ready for the public market. VCs prematurely take 
firms public to provide their investors with a speedy return on investment and earn a 
reputation for the ability to take their portfolio firms public.  This second way of 
underpricing captures the idea of grandstanding.  If grandstanding is a significant cost in 
terms of underpricing, the coefficient for this variable will be positive.        
 The first variable used to capture the spinning hypothesis is Prestigious 
UW*VC.  This variable includes a dummy variable signifying whether the IPO had a 
lead underwriter with a prestigious rank and multiplies that by a dummy variable for 
venture funding.  This variable measures whether VCs have greater underpricing when 
dealing with prestigious underwriters.  The logic for this variable is as follows.  First, this 
paper hypothesizes that VCs as decision makers will consent to greater underpricing.  
Second, spinning activity is typically thought to be centered within the confines of 
prestigious underwriters (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).  If VCs as decision makers take 
more advantage of spinning, then the coefficient for this variable will be positive.      
The next three variables, share overhang, log VC money, and insider percentage 
sold, are used to measure the incentive of pre-existing shareholders to influence 
underpricing.  Share overhang (Bradley and Jordon, 2002) measures the ratio of shares 
retained in the IPO compared to the amount of shares issued during the IPO.  This 
variable is expected to have a positive coefficient as more share overhang will lower the 
desire of pre-owners to lower underpricing.  The next variable used is Log VC money, 
which measures the largest amount invested by an individual VC into the IPO firm.  This 
variable controls for the VCs share in the private firm when it goes public.  This variable 
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should have a negative coefficient as VCs should care more about underpricing as their 
stake in the firm and potential shares sold increases.  The final of the three variables, 
insider percentage sold, measures the percentage of insiders that sold shares at the time of 
the IPO.  This variable should also be negative as insiders should be more concerned with 
underpricing when they sell a higher percentage of their shares.       
A few additional variables have been constructed to test the robustness of the 
spinning results.  The first examines VCs unique ability to re-visit the IPO market.  VCs 
can build relationships in the IPO market with underwriters through repeated trips to the 
IPO market.  The relationship variable identifies this type of relationship between lead 
VCs and lead underwriters.  The relationship dummy has a value of 1 if the VC and 
underwriter have more than one IPO together in the sample period, and a value of 0 if 
they do not.  This variable should have a positive coefficient if a relationship between 
VCs and underwriters increase underpricing.   
To further examine the robustness of the results, the next variables examine 
whether previous underpricing is correlated with future underpricing.  The variable Avg 
under 3 deals measures the average underpricing for a given lead underwriter for its 
previous three IPOs.  The variable Avg under 5 deals measures the same thing but 
looks at the previous five IPOs instead of three.  The variable last deal under represents 
underpricing from the previous IPO underwritten by the lead underwriter.  These 
variables are interacted with the VC dummy variable to form three interaction variables - 
Avg Under 3 deals*VC, Avg Under 5 deals*VC, and Last deal under*VC.  These 
variables examine the relationship between venture backing and previous underpricing.         
  18
5. Results 
5.1 Characteristics Non-Venture Backed and Venture Backed IPOs 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 5,521 IPO firms.  
The table divides the sample by venture funding, and shows the difference between non-
venture backed and venture backed IPOs.   
 
Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of 5,521 IPOs (1981-2000) 
This table looks at the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, IPOs with no venture backing, and IPOs 
with venture backing.  Underpricing is calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to 
the closing price of the stock on the first day of trading. Underwriter grade (UW Grade) is based upon the 
Carter-Manaster (1990) ratings.  Firm age is the number of years from founding date to IPO (IPO date  
founding date).  Proceeds are the amount of money received by the IPO firm in millions.  Revenue is the 
yearly revenue for the IPO firm in millions (revenue data is only available for 3,665 IPO firms).  Difference 
is defined as the sample of non-venture backed IPOs subtracted by venture backed IPOs.  Mean 
significance tests were ran on the difference between the two samples to test if they were significantly 
different from each other (***, **, * indicate significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively). 
 
 
       All            No Venture  Venture          Difference                     
# of IPOs      5,521         3,214     2,307              907 
Underpricing       0.193              0.132     0.279  -0.147*** 
Offer      12.12   11.75     12.63  -0.878*** 
High      13.01   12.91                  13.15  -0.233** 
Low                 11.18               11.15                11.22             -0.077 
Mid      12.10   12.03     12.18  -0.155 
UW Grade  7.265  6.812     7.895  -1.083*** 
Firm Age  13.63  16.07     10.24              5.830*** 
Proceeds    46.74    46.69     46.83  -0.140 
Revenue   75.96  88.09     56.78   31.41***  
 
 
 
The average underpricing for non-venture backed IPOs is 13.2 percent, whereas 
the average underpricing for venture backed IPOs is 27.9 percent.  The difference 
between the two is 14.7 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the one 
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percent level.  Average underpricing of venture backed IPOs is significantly greater than 
that of non-venture backed IPOs.  Venture backed IPO firms are much younger than non-
venture backed IPO firms, with a significant difference of almost six years.  Venture 
Backed IPOs also have a statistically higher underwriter grade.  Net proceeds for both 
types are statistically indifferent.              
5.2 Prestigious Underwriters 
Table 3 exhibits how prestigious underwriters influence venture backed and non-
venture backed IPOs.  The table sorts all IPOs into two groups by prestigious 
underwriters and then separates the data by the different time periods.  Table 3 shows that 
IPOs with prestigious underwriters have average underpricing of 10.5 percentage points 
greater than IPOs with non-prestigious underwriters for the sample period 1981-2000.  
The breakdown of the different time periods shows that this was not always the case.   
During the 1980s, IPOs with prestigious underwriters had 3 percentage points lower 
underpricing than IPOs with non-prestigious underwriters.  In the 1990s and during the 
bubble period, this trend was reversed with prestigious underwriters having greater 
underpricing.  The difference between the two types of underwriters is extreme for the 
bubble period at 34.2 percentage points.  This evidence supports the idea that the roles of 
prestigious underwriters have changed over time (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  It appears 
that prestigious underwriters used their reputation to certify quality IPOs with lower 
underpricing in the 1980s, but over time they have used their market power to increase 
the underpricing of IPOs, perhaps for their own benefit.   
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Table 3 
 
Prestigious Underwriters 
This table shows the underpricing for a double sorted sample based upon the existence of venture backing 
and a lead prestigious underwriter.  Underpricing is calculated as the percentage change in price from the 
offer price to the closing price of the stock on the first day of trading.  The table sorts based upon 
prestigious underwriter while at the same time sorting the sample by different time periods.  It then re-sorts 
the sample based on whether or not the IPO has venture backing.  Prestigious underwriters are defined as 
underwriters with a Carter-Manaster (1990) rating of 8.0 and above.  Mean significance tests were ran on 
the difference between the two samples to test if they were significantly different from each other (***, **, 
* indicate significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively). 
 
 
 Prestigious UW  Non-Prestigious UW   
       
 Sample # Underpricing Sample # Underpricing  Difference
81  00 3377 0.234 2144 0.129  0.105*** 
81  89 865 0.057 851 0.087  -0.030*** 
90  98 1905 0.161 1151 0.130  0.031*** 
99 -00 607 0.715 142 0.373  0.342*** 
       
        
 Prestigious UW with VC  Prestigious UW with No VC   
       
 Sample # Underpricing Sample # Underpricing  Difference
81  00 1734 0.326 1643 0.137  0.189*** 
81  89 338 0.076 527 0.046  0.030*** 
90  98 937 0.190 968 0.133  0.057*** 
99 -00 459 0.790 148 0.482  0.308*** 
       
        
 
Non-Prestigious UW with 
VC  
Non-Prestigious UW with 
No VC   
       
 Sample # Underpricing Sample # Underpricing  Difference
81  00 573 0.135 1571 0.127   0.008 
81  89 219 0.081 632 0.089  -0.008 
90  98 291 0.094 860 0.142  -0.049*** 
99 -00 63 0.510 79 0.264   0.246** 
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Hoberg (2003), Loughran and Ritter (2002) and (2004), and others discuss how 
underwriters may use their market power to increase underpricing.  As pointed out by 
Ritter and Welch (2002) the acceptance standards of prestigious underwriters has 
decreased over time, which appears to be linked with the increased underpricing. 
Table 3 also shows the effect of venture funding on the underpricing of IPOs.  
The table partitions venture funding by prestigious and non-prestigious underwriters.  
The results of this partition show that when prestigious underwriters work with VC firms, 
the result is higher underpricing.  The extreme case of underpricing is found in the bubble 
period for private firms that have venture funding and use prestigious underwriters.  The 
bubble time period provided the biggest opportunity for VCs and underwriters to take 
advantage of quid pro quos with average underpricing of 79 percentage points.  This table 
provides support for the spinning hypothesis, although it does not account for the 
differing risk level of each IPO over time.                
5.3 Main Regression Results 
Table 4A shows the regression results using an OLS regression with underpricing 
as the dependent variable.  Column (1) shows the VC variable with only adjustments for 
industry (two-digit SIC codes) and time (year in which the IPO was offered).  After 
controlling for industry and year differences among venture backed and non-venture 
backed IPOs, venture backed IPOs have 4.4 percentage points more underpricing than 
non-venture backed IPOs.  This is much less than the 14.7 percentage point differential 
shown in table 2 with no adjustment for industry and time.   
 
  22
Table 4A 
 
Underpricing of IPOs 
This table measures the underpricing of IPOs for both venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs in an 
OLS regression framework. Underpricing is calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer 
price to the closing price of the stock on the first day of trading.  The variables used in this regression are 
defined in table 1.  Data for revenue is only available for 3,665 IPO firms.  P values are in parenthesis.    
 
                         Dependent Variable: Underpricing   
                      (1)         (2)          (3)                (4)                
VC                        0.044            0.032     -0.067          -0.068        
                        (0.00)       (0.01)      (0.00)           (0.00)         
Log Proceeds                                 0.031      0.034            0.058        
                       (0.00)      (0.00)            (0.00)         
Log Age                                -0.034     -0.021           -0.006       
                       (0.00)              (0.00)           (0.33)         
Prestigious UW                     0.010     -0.035           -0.030         
                       (0.77)              (0.03)           (0.05)         
Log Revenues                                           -0.027  
                                             (0.00)    
1990s                         0.063       0.041              0.040            0.040   
                        (0.00)       (0.00)             (0.00)           (0.00)   
Bubble                        0.506       0.456              0.439            0.520   
                        (0.00)       (0.00)      (0.00)           (0.00)   
Prestigious UW*VC (Spinning)                               0.108            0.082  
                                     (0.00)           (0.00)        
Young Firm*VC (Grandstanding)                               0.090            0.064         
                                   (0.00)           (0.00)   
 
Industry Dummies                        Yes        Yes       Yes               Yes             
 
Constant                       0.031            -0.017      0.002            0.021         
                        (0.22)            (0.54)             (0.95)           (0.66)        
 
Observations                       5,521            5,521      5,521            3,665         
 
Adjusted R2                       0.217                 0.226      0.232            0.229    
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This result was expected because venture backed IPOs have higher concentrations in 
riskier industries and in the later years with greater underpricing.9  Column (2) adds log 
proceeds, log age, and a prestigious underwriter dummy variable.  These control 
variables lower further the underpricing differential to 3.2 percentage points between 
venture backed and non-venture IPOs.  The positive coefficient for log proceeds is as 
predicted.  The negative coefficient for log age is also as predicted, capturing the 
additional underpricing of young firms.  This additional underpricing is due to the 
increased riskiness of younger firms.  The prestigious underwriter dummy is positive but 
insignificant, perhaps capturing both the certification effect and market power effect.   
Column (3) of the regression adds the two interaction variables that measure for 
the potential incentive conflicts.  It contains several key results of this paper. The 
grandstanding variable Young Firm*VC has a positive significant coefficient of 0.09.  
This shows that underpricing is increased by 9 percentage points when VCs take firm 
public at an age of four years or less.  This additional underpricing provides evidence that 
is consistent with the implication of the grandstanding theory.10  The spinning variable, 
Prestigious UW*VC, has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.108.  Thus, 
underpricing increases by 10.8 percentage points when VCs work with a prestigious 
underwriter.  This evidence supports the spinning hypothesis.  The addition of these two 
variables flip the underpricing differential to -6.7 percentage points between venture 
backed IPOs and non-venture backed IPOs.  Now, venture backed IPOs have 6.7 
                                                
9 Underpricing has varied over time increasing from about 7% in the 1980s to about 16% in the 1990s to 
almost 60% during the bubble period (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) 
10 A cutoff point for firm age of 6 years representing the median age of firms taken public by VCs and 
defining a Young Firm was also used to test the grandstanding theory.  Similar results were obtained with 
this change, but the magnitude was slightly smaller at .065.   
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percentage points less underpricing than their non-venture backed counterparts after 
controlling for the two incentive conflicts.  Log proceeds and log age have the same sign 
as before, but the prestigious grade dummy has a significant negative sign.  After 
separating the effect of VCs and prestigious underwriter, it is now shown that prestigious 
underwriters have a negative relationship on underpricing.  This shows two things.  First, 
spinning relationship appears to be primarily centered between VCs and prestigious 
underwriters.  Second, prestigious underwriters reduce underpricing when spinning is 
controlled for.   
Column (4) adds log revenue to the model, and the coefficient is negative and 
significant as expected, which means that the higher revenue equals lower underpricing. 
The addition of log revenue does not significantly alter any of the coefficients with the 
exception of log age.  Log age is still negative but insignificant now.  The explanation for 
this change is that log revenue captures some of the underpricing explained by log age, as 
both measure the riskiness of IPOs.  Unfortunately, data restrictions reduce the sample 
size for this regression to 3,665 observations. 
 Table 4B extends the data to include IPOs issued during the post bubble period of 
2001-2003.  The original sample period is between 1981 and 2001, which is the same as 
in Lee and Wahal (2004) and is used for an easy comparison between the results here and 
theirs. The dataset is extended to see whether the primary results would remain constant 
after the burst of the bubble.   
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Table 4B 
 
Underpricing of IPOs (Extended Data Set) 
This table measures the underpricing of IPOs for both venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs in an 
OLS regression framework. Underpricing is calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer 
price to the closing price of the stock on the first day of trading.  The variables used in this regression are 
defined in table 1.  Data for revenue is only available for 3,772 IPO firms.  P values are in parenthesis.    
 
Dependant Variable: Underpricing 
Dependant Variable: Underpricing (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VC Funding Dummy 0.043 0.032 -0.065 -0.064 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Proceeds  0.024 0.028 0.054 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Age  -0.033 -0.022 -0.006 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) 
Prestigious UW Dummy  0.011 -0.034 -0.029 
  (0.41) (0.03) (0.06) 
Log Revenues    -0.026 
    (0.00) 
Nineties 0.065 0.047 0.047 0.041 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bubble 0.510 0.468 0.452 0.524 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Post Bubble 0.070 0.036 0.039 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.22) (0.18) (0.85) 
Prestigious UW * VC   0.106 0.079 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Young Firm * VC   0.089 0.064 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
     
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.019 0.018 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.36) (0.51) (0.86) (0.90) 
     
Observations 5745 5745 5745 3772 
     
Adj R-squared 0.209 0.216 0.223 0.215 
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The table illustrates that the primary results remain essentially the same after 
adding these additional IPOs, with no major change in terms of sign or significance.  The 
post bubble period dummy variable is insignificant in columns two, three, and four.  This 
shows that after controlling for various factors, the underpricing for the post bubble 
period is not significantly different from the underpricing in the 1980s.       
5.4 Endogeneity Issue    
The choice of whether to use venture funding has been described as an 
endogenous one.  VCs have many firms from which to choose because very many apply 
for venture funding.  VCs invest in a selected few of firms out of the many that apply 
(Sahlman, 1990).  Furthermore, private firms may approach multiple VCs for funding 
and good firms may have several offers to consider. The matching process is based on 
many factors, with the two most important ones being geographic location and industry.  
Geographic location is an important consideration due to the proximity between 
entrepreneur and VC.  The closer the proximity, the easier it is to monitor the 
entrepreneur.  Industry is an important consideration because individual VCs have 
expertise in certain industries.  This expertise allows for a reduction in information 
asymmetries between the VC and the entrepreneur.  Clustering in both geographical 
locations and in industries suggests the likelihood that the receipt of venture funding is an 
endogenous choice.  Lee and Wahal (2004) illustrate the endogeneity of venture-backed 
IPOs.  To control for endogeneity, a two-stage process is used.  First, probit regressions 
are used to measure the determinants of venture funding.   
Table 5 displays the probit model measuring the determinants of venture backing.      
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Table 5 
 
Determinants of Venture Backing  
This looks at the determinants of venture backing.  A Probit regression is estimated with the dependent 
variable used is a dummy variable for venture funding.  All variables used are defined in table 1.  P values 
are in parenthesis.    
                                 
     Dependent Variable:  VC Backing Dummy                               
      (1)   (2) 
Log Proceeds                         0.187                    0.243  
                                               (0.00)                         (0.00)                       
Log Age            -0.090           -0.103 
              (0.00)            (0.00) 
90s              0.060            
              (0.20) 
Bubble Period             0.442 
              (0.00) 
 
State Dummies                        Yes                             Yes                             
 
Industry Dummies                   Yes                             Yes                             
 
Constant                                  Yes                             Yes                             
 
Pseudo R-Squared                 0.188                          0.182                        
 
Column (1) uses log proceeds, log age, year dummies, state headquarter dummies, and 
industry dummies to predict the receipt of venture funding.  The pseudo R-squared for 
this model is 18.8%.  Column (2) uses the same variables but excludes the year dummies 
from the model with a pseudo R-squared of 18.2%.   
 The second stage of the endogeneity process is an OLS regression using the 
inverse Mills ratio from the previous probit regression. Table 6 shows the same 
regressions as table 4 does, but now the endogenous choice of venture capital funding is 
controlled.  Table 6 uses column (1) of the probit model from table 5 to create the inverse 
Mills ratio to control for the choice of venture funding. 
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   Table 6  
 
Underpricing of IPOs Controlling for the Endogenous Choice of Venture Backing 
This table measures the underpricing of IPOs for both venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs in an 
endogenous switching regression framework. Where the first regression is a Probit model looking at the 
probability of venture backing and the second is an OLS regression using the inverse mills ratio calculated 
as a dependent variable.  The Probit model used is from table 5 column (1).  Underpricing is calculated as 
the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock on the first day of 
trading.  The variables used in this regression are defined in table 1.  Data for revenue is only available for 
3,665 IPO firms.  P values are in parenthesis.    
    
                                                      Dependent Variable: Underpricing   
                     (1)              (2)            (3)           (4)   
VC                        0.023              0.022       -0.075              -0.070            
                        (0.03)        (0.04)        (0.00)               (0.00)         
Log Proceeds                                   0.020        0.023                0.054        
              (0.00)        (0.00)               (0.00)         
Log Age                                  -0.027       -0.015              -0.004       
                         (0.00)        (0.00)               (0.33)         
Prestigious UW                       0.005       -0.038              -0.031        
                         (0.64)             (0.01)               (0.03)         
Log Revenues                                                -0.027  
                                                  (0.00)    
1990s                         0.041         0.035        0.035               0.039   
                        (0.00)         (0.01)        (0.00)              (0.00)   
Bubble                        0.421         0.418              0.403               0.512   
                        (0.00)         (0.00)       (0.00)               (0.00)   
Prestigious UW*VC (Spinning)                                 0.104               0.081 
                            (0.00)              (0.00)        
Young Firm*VC (Grandstanding)                                 0.090               0.064         
                                     (0.00)              (0.01)   
 
Industry Dummies                       Yes         Yes         Yes                Yes               
 
Constant                      -0.021              -0.002       -0.013              0.018         
                        (0.14)              (0.94)             (0.53)             (0.44)        
 
Observations                       5,521         5,521        5,521             3,665         
 
Adjusted R2                       0.217            0.235        0.241             0.227 
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The results in table 6 are similar to those shown in table 4, with no major differences in 
the coefficients signs or magnitudes.  This table shows that the results are robust after 
controlling for endogenous choice of venture funding.  Both the spinning and 
grandstanding variables withstand this endogeneity test. 
 
6. Robustness Checks  
6.1 Share Retention and Underpricing  
 Three major parties are involved with the underpricing decision of a venture-
backed IPO.  These parties are the CEO of the private firm, the underwriter, and the 
VC.11  Both the CEO and the VC own shares and often sell a portion of those shares 
during the IPO.  The sale of these shares could influence the overall underpricing of the 
IPO.  A few studies have examined how pre-IPO ownership affects underpricing of IPOs.  
Bradley and Jordan (2002) suggest that owners who sell fewer shares suffer only 
marginally from underpricing.  They show that IPOs with high firstday returns typically 
have only a small fraction of shares sold at the time of the IPO as measured by the ratio 
of retained shares to issued shares, which they term share overhang.  This demonstrates a 
positive relation between share overhang and underpricing.  Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) 
also find a positive relation between share overhang and underpricing.  They hypothesize 
that higher share retention lowers the incentive to control underpricing.  Retained 
ownership and its effects on the prior results are examined in table 7.   
 
 
                                                
11 If the IPO is not backed with venture funding then the VC is eliminated from this group. 
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Table 7 
 
Incentives to Control Underpricing 
This table measures the underpricing of IPOs for both venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs in an 
OLS framework. Underpricing is calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the 
closing price of the stock on the first day of trading.  The variables used in this regression are defined in 
table 1.  Column (1) and (2) add share overhang to the regressions from table 4, which reduces the total 
sample size due to data requirements.  Column (3) includes only the VC-backed sample (2,307 total IPOs) 
with a small loss in observations due to data requirements (loss of 400 IPOs).  Column (4) adds the full 
sample of non-VC-backed IPOs to column (3).  Column (5) uses the full sample but has reduced 
observations due to data requirements of insider shares sold (total sample 2,586).  P values are in 
parenthesis.  
 
                                                Dependant Variable: Underpricing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VC Funding Dummy 0.033 -0.077   -0.045 
 (0.02) (0.01)   (0.08) 
Log Proceeds 0.033 0.036 0.131 0.041 0.049 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Age -0.038 -0.023 -0.057 -0.021 -0.024 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prestigious UW Dummy 0.005 -0.043 0.007 -0.041 -0.019 
 0.764 (0.02) (0.81) (0.01) (0.40) 
90's (0.46) 0.044 0.023 0.036 0.052 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.01) (0.65) 
Bubble 0.462 0.446 0.518 0.456 0.321 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Prestigious UW * VC (Spinning)  0.116  0.112 0.090 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Young Firm * VC (Grandstanding)  0.102  0.085 0.017 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.49) 
Overhang 0.008 0.008    
 (0.00) (0.00)    
VC Max Money   -0.012 -0.005  
   (0.24) (0.04)  
Insider % Sold     -0.185 
     (0.00) 
      
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Adj. R-squared 0.236 0.244 0.296 0.244 0.158 
      
Observations 4439 4439 1907 5121 2586 
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 Table 7 examines share overhang, maximum amount of VC money invested by 
any one VC, and percentage of insider shares sold to control for share retention.12  The 
first two columns of table 7 add share overhang as an independent variable to the 
regressions (columns 2 and 3) from tables 4 and 6 to measure retained ownership.13  The 
coefficient of the added overhang variable is positive and significant as expected, 
whereas a higher percentage of shares sold at the time of the IPO decreases underpricing.  
This result is consistent with the work of Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001).  The results from the first two columns show that the inclusion of the 
overhang variable does not affect the results shown in tables 4 and 6.  The coefficients for 
the variables of interest in this paper, spinning and grandstanding, remain positive and 
significant.  In fact, the magnitudes of the two variables are increased as shown in 
column (2) of table 7.   
Column (3) of table 7 only looks at the VC-backed sample to examine if 
underpricing is affected by the amount of money invested by the VC with the highest 
stake in an IPO.14  Megginson and Weiss (1991) report VCs own 36 percent of the firm 
before the IPO and 26 percent after the IPO.  With this in mind, VCs should be concerned 
with underpricing as they sell shares during the IPO.  This should mitigate VCs 
incentive to spin unless the benefit of spinning is greater than the loss of money from the 
increased underpricing.  The coefficient for the VC money variable is negative but not 
                                                
12 The results shown are in an OLS framework, but the results do not change if the two-stage approach from 
Table 6 is implemented. 
13 The numbers of observations are reduced by about 1,000 due to the information on overhang, leaving a 
sample of 4,439. 
14 This regression includes only the VC-backed sample, which consists of 2,307 total IPOs.  Four hundred 
IPOs are lost due to the data requirements of the VC money invested variable. 
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significant for the VC sample.  This provides evidence that VCs might have a different 
incentive structure than other investors as shown with share overhang. 
Column (4) of table 7 includes the entire sample, adding in the non-VC-backed 
sample.15  The VC money variable is used as the variable to control for venture backing 
as it measures the amount of money that is invested by the highest invested venture firm.  
Non-venture firms by definition have zero invested by VCs.  The results from column (4) 
support the results in tables 4 and 6, both the spinning and grandstanding variables are 
significant.  The coefficient for the amount of money invested by the VC with the highest 
stake in the private firm is negative and significant.  This agrees with the VC dummy 
variable from tables 4 and 6, showing that VCs indeed reduce underpricing as they invest 
more money in the private firm.  Columns (3) and (4) from table 7 were also run with 
total VC money invested in the private firm instead of maximum amount by a single VC 
with the same results.                          
 Column (5) from table 7 uses another proxy for pre-IPO owners effect on the 
underpricing of IPOs by looking at the percentage of insiders that sold shares during the 
IPO.16  It is expected that the coefficient for insider percentage sold would be negative 
and significant as insiders would be concerned with the offer price of the IPO.  The result 
is as expected with the coefficient of the insider percentage sold variable being negative 
and significant.  The spinning variable remains positive and significant.  Interestingly, the 
grandstanding variable loses its significance with the inclusion of this variable.  Perhaps, 
                                                
15 Adding the non-VC-backed sample increases total observations to 5,121. 
16 Due to data restrictions on insider sales, the total sample size on this regression is 2,586.  
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this is due to the fact that insiders mitigate the problem associated with grandstanding or 
perhaps the sample size reduction eliminates the firms most likely to grandstand.   
6.2 VC Spinning Variable: Relationship between VCs and Underwriters 
 This section and the next further examine the spinning variable by using different 
proxies for spinning.  The previous tables demonstrate that underpricing is positively 
correlated with the interaction variable Prestigious UW*VC, which shows that 
spinning is positively related with underpricing.  The focus of this section is to further 
examine this relationship between VCs and underwriters.  The spinning theory postulates 
that the decision makers of IPOs will agree to underprice their IPO to trade rents with 
underwriters (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).  The assertion made by this paper is that VCs 
as decision makers will have a greater incentive to take advantage of this potential quid 
pro quo agreement.  The first part of this section attempts to further capture the 
relationship between VCs and underwriters.  A relationship variable is created that 
attempts to capture whether there is a working relationship between VCs and 
underwriters.  VCs and underwriters are considered to have a relationship if they have 
more than one deal together within the sample period.  An example of this relationship 
between VCs and underwriters is shown in Figure 1.  For this particular example, the VC 
would have a relationship with underwriters 1 and 4 in the diagram because they have 
more than one IPO with that underwriter.17  
                                                
17 The relationship is measured only by using the lead underwriter and the lead VC.  The lead underwriter is 
defined by SDC Platinum.  The lead VC is defined as the first VC firm to fund the private firm.  If two VCs 
fund the firm at the same time, the one with a larger amount of funding is used as the lead.  
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As mentioned earlier in this paper, VCs can enforce the underwriters end of the quid-
pro-quo argument through their future business with underwriters.  VCs would enforce 
this by only bringing future IPOs to underwriters that fulfilled their end of the bargain.  
Repeated business between VCs and underwriters should represent the highest 
underpricing to support this version of the spinning theory.  The idea behind the 
relationship variable is to find out how underpricing is affected when VCs and 
underwriters work together repeatedly.   
This relationship between VCs and underwriters is tested in a multiple regression 
analysis in table 8.  The first three columns of table 8 look at only IPOs with venture 
funding.  Column (1) illustrates the full sample of IPOs with venture funding and the 
relationship variable has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.089.  This shows that 
when VCs and underwriters work together regularly, underpricing increases by 8.9 
percentage points.  Given that an IPO has venture funding, a relationship between VC 
and underwriters significantly increases underpricing, supporting the spinning theory.  
Column (2) eliminates the bubble period from the sample of venture backed IPOs.  The 
relationship variable is positive and significant even after the exclusion of the bubble 
period.  This result shows that the relationship variable measuring spinning is significant 
both inside and outside the bubble period.  Column (3) exhibits only venture backed IPOs 
that use prestigious underwriters.  The relationship variable coefficient is positive and 
significant, 0.09. This shows the importance of the relationship between VCs and 
underwriters, even when only looking at prestigious underwriters.  
 
 
  36 
 
Table 8 
 
Relationship between VCs and Underwriters 
This table measures the underpricing of IPOs for both venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs in an 
OLS regression framework. Underpricing is calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer 
price to the closing price of the stock on the first day of trading.  The variables used in this regression are 
defined in table 1.  The first 3 columns of the regression look at only venture backed IPOs with column (1), 
(2), and (3) looking at the whole sample, the sample without the bubble period IPOs, and the sample with 
only IPOs that have prestigious underwriters respectively.  Columns (4) and (5) look at venture and non 
venture backed IPOs with column (4) and (5) looking at the whole sample and the sample without bubble 
period IPOs.  Bubble period IPOs include IPOs issued in 1999 and 2000.  P values are in parenthesis.    
 
 
               Dependent Variable: Underpricing                     
       
 VC Backed IPOs  Only VC & Non VC IPOs 
 Full Sample
No 
Bubble Prestigious Full Sample No Bubble 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
VC    0.020 -0.005 
    (0.09) (0.49) 
Log Proceeds 0.085 0.043 0.109 0.031 0.012 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Age -0.060 -0.029 -0.071 -0.033 -0.020 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prestigious UW 0.013 0.013  0.006 0.000 
 (0.60) (0.29)  (0.64) (0.95) 
1990s 0.031 0.056 0.050 0.040 0.061 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bubble 0.503  0.530 0.461  
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  
Relationship 0.089 0.048 0.090 0.099 0.060 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -0.070 -0.010 -0.148 0.019 0.063 
 (0.39) (0.79) (0.18) (0.54) (0.00) 
       
Observations 2307 1785 1734 5521 4772 
       
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.141 0.273 0.228 0.082 
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Columns (4) and (5) show the full sample, including both venture backed and 
non-venture backed IPOs.  Column (4) provides a similar result to that of column (1) but 
now the relationship variable has a coefficient of 0.099.  Column (5) illustrates the entire 
sample minus the IPOs issued during the bubble period.  The results of column (5) 
demonstrate that even outside of the bubble period, the relationship variable coefficient is 
positive and significant 0.06.  The results from table 8 show the relationship between 
VCs and underwriters as paramount in explaining underpricing both inside and outside of 
the bubble period.         
6.3 VC Spinning Variable: Previous Underpricing 
The previous results show that repeated business between VCs and underwriters 
increase underpricing, which lends more support to the spinning hypothesis.  Another 
important implication of the spinning hypothesis shown in Loughran and Ritter (2004) is 
that the decision makers of IPOs, VCs or the CEO of the private firms, enlist the services 
of underwriters that have large amounts of underpricing in the past.  They make a 
decision to partner with an underwriter with the knowledge that underpricing was high in 
the past and will be high for their IPO as well.  Because underpricing is easily observed 
by market participants, each successive deal by an underwriter updates the previous 
knowledge of underpricing by that particular underwriter.   
Do underwriters that had high underpricing in the past continue to underprice 
IPOs more than those that had lower underpricing?  This section addresses this question. 
In fact, it addresses the bigger issue of this paper: Do venture backed IPOs have a larger 
magnitude of underpricing than IPOs without VC-backing?  To test the hypothesis that 
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when VCs deal with underwriters that have underpriced IPOs to a large extent in the past, 
the current underpricing is also larger, a variable was created to capture the past deal 
underpricing by the lead underwriter.  The Avg Under 3 deals variable looks at the 
average underpricing of the previous three IPOs by an underwriter.   For example, if the 
last three IPOs by an underwriter had underpricing of 10%, 20%, and 30%, the average 
would be 20%.   
The results of this analysis are shown in table 9.  The regression in column (1) 
shows that current underpricing is positively correlated to the past IPO underpricing by 
the lead underwriter.  Underwriters that underprice more in the past continue to 
underprice IPOs more greatly than underwriters with less average underpricing in the 
past.  Column (2) illustrates the same result as column (1) but changes the number of 
previous underwriter deals to five instead of three.  The results are the same with 
underpricing positively correlated to previous underpricing by the same underwriter.     
Who chooses underwriters with a reputation for high underpricing, and what is 
the result when different decision makers pick different underwriters?  This paper has 
made the assertion that VCs will select underwriters with a reputation for high 
underpricing and work with them in a spinning relationship to secure rents.  The evidence 
provided in column (3) of the regression supports this claim.  To measure it, an 
interaction variable between VC-funding and average underpricing is added to the 
regression from column (1).  Current underpricing is still correlated with previous 
underpricing, but now the interaction variable is also positive and significant.   
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Table 9  
 
Previous Underpricing by Underwriters 
This table measures the underpricing of IPOs for both venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs in an 
OLS regression framework. Underpricing is calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer 
price to the closing price of the stock on the first day of trading.  The variables used in this regression are 
defined in table 1.  P values are in parenthesis.    
  
            Dependent Variable: Underpricing                                
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VC 0.027 0.027 -0.027 -0.043 0.009 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.48) 
Log Proceeds 0.037 0.040 0.037 0.040 0.038 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Age -0.031 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prestigious UW 0.008 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.001 
 (0.59) (0.95) (0.53) (0.86) (0.94) 
1990s 0.017 0.013 0.024 0.022 0.027 
 (0.22) (0.39) (0.08) (0.14) (0.04) 
Bubble 0.291 0.246 0.286 0.247 0.374 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Avg under 3 deals 0.313  0.099   
 (0.00)  (0.01)   
Avg under 5 deals  0.417  0.122  
  (0.00)  (0.01)  
Last Deal Under     0.095 
     (0.00) 
VC*Avg under 3 deals   0.293   
   (0.00)   
VC*Avg under 5 deals    0.389  
    (0.00)  
VC*Last deal under     0.116 
     (0.00) 
      
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant -0.026 -0.046 -0.004 -0.016 -0.011 
 (0.47) (0.23) (0.91) (0.68) (0.73) 
      
Observations 4373 4004 4373 4004 4929 
      
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.299 0.291 0.311 0.266 
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VCs appear to seek out underwriters with reputations for high levels of underpricing and 
then strike deals for greater levels of underpricing.  Column (4) shows that the results 
found in column (3) are robust to the use of the previous five deals of underwriters.  The 
only difference in the results of these two is the magnitudes of the variables.  Column (5) 
makes the assumption that only the previous IPOs underpricing by an underwriter 
matters.  The results are similar to the earlier results using the previous three and five 
IPOs.  
6.4 Dummy Variable Issues 
 Table 10 examines potential problems with using dummy variables in the primary 
regressions.  Perhaps, some of the results reported in tables 4 and 6 are due to the use of 
multiple dummy variables.  Table 10 attempts to examine this issue by creating 
interaction with continuous variables and the VC dummy to measure grandstanding and 
spinning as well as using each year as a dummy variable instead of grouping these 
variables as to check for any potential mismeasurement in the earlier results.  The results 
show that this is not the case, as there is no change to the primary variables of interest. 
 Column (1) of table 10 switches the spinning variable and the grandstanding 
variable from an interaction between two dummy variables to an interaction between the 
VC funding dummy and log age and underwriter grade.  The prestigious underwriter 
dummy is also changed to underwriter grade.  The results for this regression are 
consistent with the story from the previous regressions.  The spinning variable is positive 
and significant, showing that as grade increases for VC-backed IPOs, underpricing 
increases as predicted by the spinning hypothesis.  Yet, underwriter grade outside of VC 
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funding is negative and significant.  The grandstanding variable is also significant as VCs 
have significantly lower underpricing as the age of the IPO firm at the time of the IPO is 
higher.  This result is consistent with the grandstanding hypothesis.  Column (2) further 
examines this by eliminating the grouped time variables and replaces it with year dummy 
variables.  The results of this test are consistent with the idea that spinning and 
grandstanding increase underpricing for venture-backed IPOs.   
 Columns (3) and (4) break up the sample by prestigious underwriter.  Column (3) 
eliminates all IPOs issued by prestigious underwriters, whereas column (4) includes only 
IPOs issued by prestigious underwriters.18  If prestigious underwriters lead to higher 
underpricing when dealing with VCs, then the expectation is that the VC dummy variable 
would have a higher coefficient in column (4) than in column (3).  The results of these 
two regressions support this expectation and the earlier result of the interaction dummy 
variable used to measure spinning.  Also of interest is the coefficient for underwriter 
grade in columns (3) and (4).  When looking at column (3) the coefficient for grade is 
negative and significant at the 10% level.  This result supports the idea that better 
underwriters reduce underpricing.  This is not the case when looking at column (4), 
which only includes IPOs underwritten by prestigious underwriters, where the coefficient 
for grade is positive and significant.  This shows a move upward in level of prestige leads 
to higher underpricing.  This supports the idea that better underwriters may increase 
underpricing. This evidence also supports the argument that spinning between VCs and 
prestigious underwriters appears to be a major incentive conflict. 
                                                
18 The cut-off for prestigious underwriters is a grade of 8 as measured by the revised Carter and Manaster 
(1990) grades. 
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Table 10 
 
Reexamination of Dummy Variables 
This table measures the underpricing of IPOs for both venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs in an 
OLS framework and eliminates the use of multiple dummy variables as in table 4. Underpricing is 
calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock on the first 
day of trading.  Columns (3) and (4) separate the sample into two groups.  Column (3) has all IPOs that 
were underwritten by non-prestigious underwriters, while column (4) includes those underwritten by only 
prestigious underwrites.  The variables used in this regression are defined in table 1.  P values are in 
parenthesis.  
 
 
                                                   Dependant Variable: Underpricing   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VC Funding Dummy -0.148 -0.152 -0.027 0.053 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Log Proceeds 0.038 0.037 0.029 0.038 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Age -0.019 -0.017 -0.014 -0.037 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Underwriter Grade -0.011 -0.011 -0.006 0.0403 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) 
90's 0.036    
 (0.01)    
Bubble 0.432    
 (0.00)    
Grade * VC 0.037 0.037   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
Age * VC -0.045 -0.045   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
     
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Adj R-squared 0.232 0.236 0.126 0.266 
     
Observations 5521 5521 2144 3377 
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7. Conclusion  
This essay identifies two incentive conflicts between VCs and the private firms 
they take public to explain the difference in underpricing between venture backed and 
non-venture backed IPOs.  These two incentive conflicts are grandstanding describe by 
Gompers (1996) and spinning of IPOs described by Loughran and Ritter (2004).  Both 
incentive conflicts appear to lead to greater underpricing for IPOs with venture capital 
backing.  The grandstanding theory has been examined and its robustness has been shown 
in previous work of Gompers (1996) and Lee and Wahal (2004).  This paper provides 
similar robustness for the spinning theory.    After controlling for the two incentive 
conflicts, venture capital funding is shown to be negatively correlated with underpricing, 
supporting the results of prior researchers that demonstrate the abilities of VCs to monitor 
and certify IPOs.  This paper, therefore, reconciles the conflicting results between the 
earlier and more recent literature.   
An interesting extension to this study is to investigate the time period after the 
adoption of anti-spinning laws in 2003.  The behavior of VCs and underwriters may 
change after the anti-spinning laws are passed. It would be interesting to see if the 
significance of the spinning variables disappears. It will also test the effectiveness of the 
laws in eliminating spinning of IPOs. 
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Essay 2 
Do VCs Provide Anything More Than Money? 
I. Introduction 
The role of venture capitalists (VCs) remains a heavily contested issue.  Many 
researchers argue that VCs provide valuable services to the companies in which they 
invest, but current research comes up short in providing strong empirical evidence to 
support this contention.  The role of VCs has often been examined at the time of the IPO.  
If VCs provide benefits to the IPO firm through increased monitoring (Barry, Muscarella, 
Peavy, and Vetsuypens, 1990) and/or certification (Megginson and Weiss, 1991), then 
underpricing should be reduced for VC-backed IPOs because investors recognize the 
added benefit of a VC-backed IPO.  Evidence illustrating a beneficial role provided by 
VCs in terms of lowering the underpricing of IPOs has been mixed at best.  In fact, new 
evidence indicates that VC-backed IPOs have higher risk-adjusted underpricing than non-
VC-backed IPOs.19   
Rather than focusing on underpricing of VC-backed IPOs, this chapter examines 
the role VCs may play in the performance of newly public firms after the IPO.  That is, 
do VCs provide any long-term identifiable benefits to the firms in which they take an 
equity stake, or do VCs simply provide capital?  To date, long-run performance studies 
on VCs have yielded vastly different results.20  The purpose of this study is to examine 
                                                
19 Early work including Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
etc. has shown that VC-backing was negatively related to underpricing.  In contrast, recent work including 
Lee and Wahal (2004) and Flagg (2006) have shown a much different result with VC-backing positively 
related to underpricing, perhaps due to grandstanding (Lee and Wahal, 2004) and spinning (Flagg, 2006).   
20 Brav and Gompers (1997) document VC-backed IPOs as having performed marginally better than non-
VC backed IPOs.  Chan, et al. (2005) examine the long-run performance of IPOs and find that for large 
  45 
 
different long-run characteristics and identify if VCs provide long-run benefits after the 
IPO.  In order to identify these differences, this paper will examine the inherent 
advantages that VCs may bring to firms beyond providing capital.  
Brav and Gompers (1997) are one of the first to identify any difference in the 
long-run performance of VC-backed versus non-VC-backed IPO.  Brav and Gompers 
find that VC-backed IPOs perform moderately better than their non-VC-backed 
counterparts.  They illustrate three major reasons why VC-backed IPOs may perform 
differently from non-VC-backed IPOs.  First, VCs implement management structures that 
help the firm perform better in the long-run and VCs use their industry expertise to 
improve the firms operations.  With these two factors in mind, firms with venture 
backing may have better long-run performance than firms without venture backing.  This 
paper attempts to find this performance gap by looking at long-run returns and 
accounting performance.  Second, VCs may affect who holds the firms shares after an 
IPO.  Perhaps, more large investors will hold shares of VC-backed IPOs because VCs 
have contacts with large investment banks.  Contacts with large investment banks can 
also increase the firms ability to raise capital.  This paper measures the benefit of 
increased access to capital by measuring firms level of financial constraint.  Third, VCs 
obtain positions on the board of directors of the start-up firms and retain these positions 
long after the IPO.  VCs may be able to improve the governance of start-up firms by 
                                                                                                                                            
sized IPOs that VC-backing is positively related to long-run stock performance.  Campbell and Fry (2004) 
show no major difference in stock performance between VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs.  Dolvin and 
Pyles (2005) find that VC-backing does not lead to better long-run performance.   
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retaining positions on the board of directors.  This paper evaluates improved governance 
by examining different measures of governance.    
Hellman and Puri (2002) discuss how VCs play a role beyond that of a traditional 
financial intermediary.  They document that obtaining VC funding is associated with the 
formulation of human resource policies, the adoption of stock plans, and the hiring of a 
VP of sales and marketing.  They argue that VCs increase the long-run performance of 
VC-backed IPOs.  Brav and Gompers (1997) and Hellman and Puri (2002) make clear 
distinctions that VCs provide support to private firms beyond capital.       
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways.  First, it will examine the 
long-run differences between VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs in a previously 
unexplored way by looking at three different measures.  The extant research mainly 
focuses on return-based measures with mixed results.  Besides examining returns, this 
paper will focus on measures that drive long-run returns, such as accounting 
performance, access to capital, and governance, so as to provide a clear distinction 
between the two IPO types.  Second, this paper will attempt to explain why the current 
literature has such differing results when it comes to the long-term performance of VC-
backed IPOs.          
This paper finds significant differences between the long-run characteristics of 
venture and non-venture backed IPOs.  Similar to prior studies, long-run stock 
performance is mixed at best.  Different measures for long-run stock performance leads 
to different conclusions about the benefit to venture funding in terms of long-run returns.  
Contrary to prevailing wisdom, VC-backed IPOs perform much worse than non-VC 
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backed IPOs in terms of accounting measures, such as ROA, Cash flow per assets, and 
sales per assets.  These accounting results are economically important as VC-backed 
IPOs have a ROA 3.4 percentage points lower than non-VC-backed IPOs after 
controlling for time, different industries, and various risk measures.  The results for cash 
flow and sales mirror this same story.  This evidence provides a result that differs from 
what is expected.  The results are in direct opposition to the work done by Jain and Kini 
(1995) and the ideas discussed in Brav and Gompers (1997) and Hellman and Puri 
(2002).   
The results on access to capital show VCs significantly improve the IPO firms 
access to capital.  VC-backed IPOs are less financially constrained than non-VC-backed 
IPOs.  VC-backed IPO firms are found to have significantly lower KZ scores (measure 
for financial constraint), to lower debt ratios, and to have a much greater probability of 
being financial unconstrained three years after the IPO.  This result is consistent with the 
ideas discussed in Brav and Gompers (1997) that VCs lead to better access to capital.  
The results on governance are mixed but provide some evidence that VCs may lead to 
better firm governance.   
Finally, this paper argues that the differences in accounting performance and 
access to capital provide an explanation for the differences in long-run returns found in 
the current literature.  This is found in the cross sectional explanation of long-run returns.  
ROA is positively correlated to long-run returns while financial constraint is negatively 
correlated with long-run returns.  Given the differences of the two, these contradicting 
effects may lead to the different results found in long-run returns.   
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This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the related literature and 
implications to the firm with venture backing.  Section 3 describes the data that will be 
used in this paper.  Section 4 reviews and analyzes the variables that will be used in this 
study.  Section 5 discusses the results.  Section 6 concludes this essay.  
 
2. Related Literature and Implications 
 
2.1 Long-Run IPO Performance  
Long-run stock performance of IPOs has been an area of intense debate for some 
time.  One issue with long-run performance of IPOs is that a newly formed public firm 
should be accurately priced in the market.  The current market price should reflect all 
future cash flows from the firm, or simply stated, the long-run performance should not be 
predictable by any characteristics of the IPO.  A common inference from results of long-
term abnormal performance studies is that average buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) following major corporate events are very far from zero. This idea suggests that 
the market is not efficient and all future cash flows are not accurately priced during IPOs 
or other corporate events.  Many behavioral reasons have been poised to explain the long-
run underperformance of IPOs.   
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) first show that IPOs exhibit 
significant underperformance in the three to five years following the IPOs, with the 
returns of IPOs being much less than the portfolios of comparable seasoned stocks.  
Ritter (1991) proposes a behavioral argument that the difference is due to investor 
overreaction.  The idea is that investors may be systematically over-optimistic about the 
future performance of IPO firms.  This optimism leads to over-brought IPOs and 
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subsequent poor performance.  This underperformance has been documented and heavily 
debated but very few papers have been able to explain the cross section of these long-run 
returns (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  The exceptions have been found in Mikkelson, Partch, 
and Shahs (1997) accounting measures, Teoh, Welch, and Wongs (1998) optimistic 
accounting, and Purnanandam and Swaminathans (2003) overvalued offer prices relative 
to comparables. 
2.1.2 Long-Run IPO Performance and VCs 
Many papers discuss potential benefits that VCs provide to the firms they finance, 
but only a handful test whether VCs actually improve the long-run performance of the 
firm.  These long-run VC studies attempt to measure VC performance through long-run 
returns and have mixed results.  Brav and Gompers (1997) document VC-backed IPOs as 
having performed marginally better than non-VC backed IPOs.  Chan, et al. (2005) 
examine the long-run performance of IPOs and attempt to figure out what characteristics 
of IPOs increase long-run performance.  They find that for large sized IPOs, VC backing 
is positively related to long-run stock performance.  Campbell and Fry (2004) show no 
major difference in stock performance between VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs.  
They do show that higher VC board membership leads to better long-term stock 
performance for the firm.  Dolvin and Pyles (2005) find that VC backing does not lead to 
better long-run performance.  They find that VC backing actually decreases long-run 
stock performance, although the significance of the performance is marginal.  As shown 
in these differing results, the long-run stock performance of VC-backed IPOs is generally 
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inconclusive.  Based on the evidence from this paper using stock returns, it is also unclear 
if VCs provide any long-run benefit to IPO firms. 
2.1.3 Issues/Controversy with Long-Run Performance  
Long-run studies on IPO underperformance provide an interesting and 
controversial topic.  Ritter and Welch (2002) summarize the topic and point out two 
problems in the long-run studies.   The two problems are the methodology and time 
period used in measuring long-run stock returns.  They point out that varied methodology 
or time period can change the results dramatically.  This section discusses some of the 
common problems associated with long-run returns.  
Barber and Lyon (1997) propose calculating BHARs.  This technique matches 
what an investor might try and accomplish, purchasing and holding stocks in a portfolio.  
The biases that arise in using this method come from new listings, rebalancing of 
benchmark portfolios, and skewness of multiyear abnormal returns.  Some corrections 
discussed are careful construction of benchmark portfolios, large samples, and 
bootstrapping techniques.  Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) document that two general 
approaches yield well-specified test statistics in random samples.  The first approach uses 
a traditional event study framework calculating BHARs using carefully constructed 
reference portfolios, such that the population mean abnormal return is identically zero.  
The second approach is based on the calculation of mean monthly abnormal returns using 
calendar-time portfolios and a time-series t-statistic.      
Fama (1998) argues against BHAR methodologies because the systematic errors 
are compounded with long-horizon returns.  He also states, that any methodology 
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ignoring cross-sectional dependence of event-firm abnormal returns that are overlapping 
in calendar time is likely to produce overstated t-statistics. Fama strongly advocates 
monthly calendar-time portfolio approach for measuring long-term abnormal returns.  He 
illustrates that skewness bias can cause BHARs to overstate long-run performance, even 
when there is no abnormal return after the first month.  Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
provides more evidence in the same direction of Fama (1998).  Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) reconcile the two views by investigating the impact on inferences of several 
potential, but often overlooked, problems with common methodologies using three well-
studied samples of major managerial decisions.  Major corporate events cluster through 
time by industry leading to cross-correlation of abnormal returns, making test statistics 
that assume independence severely overstated.  Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find that a 
3-year average BHAR of 15% is not statistically different from zero. Hence, after 
accounting for positive cross-correlations of individual-firm BHARs, they find no 
reliable evidence of long-term abnormal performance for any of the three event samples 
when using BHAR approach.  
Loughran and Ritter (2000) point out that there is a basis in the Fama and French 
(1993) factors that force the intercepts to zero in time series calendar time regressions.  It 
is due to the factors themselves being contaminated with IPO data.  Due to the high 
number of documented problems with returns, perhaps long-run returns are not the most 
effective way to measure the long-run benefits provided by VCs.  To avoid the issues 
with stock returns, accounting measures will be used to gauge the financial performance 
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of IPOs.  As mentioned earlier, accounting measures have been shown to be important in 
IPO long-run performance.  
2.2 Access to Capital 
Firm access to capital is of extreme importance.  The lack of ability to raise funds 
or reasonably priced funds negatively affects firm value.  The recent literature on 
financial constraints points out that financially constrained firms find it difficult or 
extremely expensive for them to raise capital to finance valuable growth opportunities.  
Fazzari, et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Cleary (1999) among others 
examine the financing needs of firms.  The financial constraint literature has implied that 
information costs and the internal resources of a firm influence the cost of external funds.  
The challenge is to identify constrained and unconstrained firms at a particular point 
in time.  Lamont, et al (2001) use the results from Kaplan and Zingaless (1997) logit 
regressions to build a measure that evaluates the firm level of financial constraint called 
the KZ index.  Each firm has a KZ index score based on factors that make it harder or 
more expensive to raise capital.  Higher KZ index scores mean a higher level of financial 
constraint.  Debt ratio is also shown as a measure of firm level financial constraint by 
Whited (1992) and Whited and Wu (2006).  Higher debt ratios especially as compared to 
other firms in the same industry leads to firms that are more constrained.  If VCs improve 
firms access to capital, then VC-backed IPOs should have lower KZ index scores and 
lower debt-to-asset ratio.          
2.3 Venture Capitalists and Governance 
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Agency theory alleges that managers do not always act in the best interest of 
shareholders.  Shareholders as primary owners attempt to mitigate managerial agency, so 
that the goals of managers are better aligned with shareholders.  This is a difficult and 
costly proposition for small shareholders.  In contrast, VCs own economically significant 
equity positions after the IPO (Barry, et al., 1990).  As large shareholders of the firm, 
VCs have the unique ability and desire to monitor managers closely.  Sahlman (1990) 
argues that VCs are involved in the day-to-day operations and often become members of 
the board.  Being involved in the day-to-day operations and sitting on the board of 
directors enables VCs to be informed and make critical decisions concerning the firm.  
Lerner (1995) discusses VCs monitoring ability while on the board of directors and how 
they increase their involvement as the need for involvement increases.  He illustrates an 
example of this behavior, with the number of VCs board members increasing when the 
CEO of a firm is replaced.  
Baker and Gompers (2002) show that board structure is influenced by VCs, as 
they shift the board structure away from insiders towards independent outside directors.  
Baker and Gompers (2002) also point out that VCs are a counter weight to CEO control, 
where higher VC involvement means lower CEO control.  Heaton (2002) shows that 
managers of IPO firms are overly optimistic and might over-invest in poor projects if the 
firm has excess funds.  Firm governance has been documented as a critical component in 
firm success.  Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) develop a governance index that 
measures the power of shareholder rights, which proxies for the governance of firms.  
They illustrate a positive link between good governance of firms and higher firm stock 
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returns.  Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferell (2005) take the G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) and develop an entrenchment index (E-Index) that measures how 
entrenched firm managers are.  This measure offers another proxy for firm governance 
and finds a link between less entrenched managers and stock performance.   
 Larker, Richardson, and Tuna (2006) argue that the G-Index does not do a great 
job in capturing how good and bad governance firms should act in the market place.  
They show that the G-index does not have very much explanatory power for the cross-
sectional difference in key variables that indicate good or bad governance of the 
firm.  One of the variables they use to examine the quality of governance is abnormal 
accruals.  Abnormal accruals gauge the quality of firm earnings, and one would think that 
firms with poor governance would have a higher amount of abnormal accruals.  If the 
earnings management is directional, the appropriate measure is the raw value of abnormal 
accruals and not the absolute value.  For example, poorly governed firms will manage 
their earnings more than well governed firms. If VCs improve the governance measures 
of a start-up firm for the long-run, the governance of VC-backed IPOs should be better 
than that of non-VC backed IPOs. 
 
3. Data 
The data collection process for this paper includes the following stages:  First, all 
IPOs for the time period 19902000 are identified through Securities Data Exchange 
(SDC).  Information taken from SDC include IPO characteristics such as offer date, offer 
price, closing price, underwriter ranking, net proceeds, net revenues, and a dummy 
  55 
 
variable illustrating venture backing.  The dummy variable representing venture funding 
has been corrected in a few areas where venture funding existed but was not marked as a 
venture-backed firm.  IPOs that had a venture flag but no venture capital firm are 
detected and eliminated from the sample.  Problems with the SDC venture backing flag 
have been identified by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003).  Information on the founding 
date of the firms included in the IPO sample was obtained from Jay Ritters website.   
This variable is from the Field-Ritter dataset of company founding dates, as used in Field 
and Karpoff (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004).  The founding date is used to obtain 
the age of the firm at the time of its IPO.  Firm age is calculated as the IPO date minus 
the founding date.   
In the next stage, firm returns for the three years after the IPO are identified for all 
of the IPOs found in the CRSP database.  The three-year return will be calculated one 
month after the IPO offer date which includes the first day return or underpricing.  This 
month is eliminated to provide a more clear measure of stock performance for the IPO 
firm, eliminating the month following the IPO offer date.  The return data will be used to 
estimate the buy-and-hold three year stock returns for all IPOs as well as the 180-day 
return measuring the lock-up period.  The return data from the CRSP database are also 
combined with the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to calculate a calendar 
time adjusted alpha measuring abnormal performance, for both the venture backed and 
non-venture backed IPOs.  The Fama and French (1993) factors were obtained from 
Kenneth Frenchs web page.  
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After finding the stock returns, the next stage is finding accounting variables from 
the Compustat database for the first three years of firm operations.  For IPOs issued 
before June 30th, the offer year is used as the first year, and for those IPOs offered after 
this cut-off date the following year is used as the first year.  The variables obtained 
include net income, revenues, assets, cash flow, dividend payout, accruals, and the 
variables needed to calculate both the KZ Index and the Laker, Richardson, and Tuna 
(2006) version of abnormal accruals.  After finding all accounting data and eliminating 
any IPO with missing information, the final stage is to collect the Gompers, Ishy, and 
Metric (2003) governance index and the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) 
entrenchment index.   
 
4. Variables Used in Regressions 
This section will define the different variables used in this paper.  A brief 
definition of the variables is found in table 11.  This section will define the variables in 
detail and provide the motivation for the choice of each. 
4.1 Stock Performance 
It is hypothesized that VC-backed IPOs will perform better than non-VC-backed 
IPOs.  To measure this, stock returns will be measured for three years after the IPO. The 
first measure used is a three-year compounded return.  This measure, used by Ritter 
(1991), mimics the investors overall return for holding the IPO for three-years. This 
holding period begins one month after the IPO offer date to eliminate any bias in the first 
months performance.   
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Table 11 
 
Variables Used in Regressions  
 
Variables   Definitions 
 
STOCK PERFORMANCE 
 
1. Compounded Return Ritter (1991) approach: Buy and hold returns are calculated 
by compounding the raw monthly returns for a three year 
time period and for the lock-up period (typically 180 days). 
 
2. BHARs Barber and Lyon (1995) approach: Buy and hold returns 
are calculated by taking the monthly return of each IPO and 
subtracting the benchmark return yielding the abnormal 
monthly return.  This monthly abnormal return is 
compounded for a three year time period and 180 days.      
 
3. Abnormal Return Alpha Fama and French (1998) approach: Calendar time adjusted 
abnormal returns using the market model and Fama and 
French (1993) three factor model.   
 
ACCOUTING PERFORMANCE 
 
1. ROA The firms net income divided by the total assets of the 
firm.  
 
2. Cash Flow/Assets  The firms cash flow standardized by total assets. 
 
3. Sales/Assets   The three year sales of the firm divided by assets. 
 
 
ACCESS TO AND COST OF CAPITAL 
 
1. KZ Index Index that measures the financial constraint level of firms.  
Based on the work of Kaplan and Zanglas (1997) and 
Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001). 
 
2. Financial Constraint  A dummy variable representing the lowest third or the most 
constraint firms in the sample based upon the KZ Index. 
 
3. Debt-to-Asset Ratio The ratio of a firms debt to assets. 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
Variables Used in Regressions  
 
Variables   Definitions 
 
GOVERNANCE 
 
1. G-Index The Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Governance Index, 
which measures the strength of shareholder rights. 
 
2. E-Index The Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) Entrenchment 
Index that measures the entrenchment level of management 
(scale of 1  6). 
 
3. Abnormal Accruals The deviation from the standard or expected accrual of the 
firm.  This is measured in a regression with total accruals 
shown in Larker, Richardson, and Tuna (2004).  
 
IPO CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1. VC A dummy variable signifying venture funding.  A value of 
1 represents venture funding and 0 does not. 
 
2. Offer Price  The offer price of the IPO.  
 
3. Log Age The natural log of the firms age at the time of the IPO.  
Firm age is measured as IPO date  founding date. 
 
4. Log Assets The natural log of total assets for the IPO firm.  
 
5. Prestigious UW Dummy variable given if the lead underwriter firm for the 
IPO has a rank of 8 or above. 
 
6. Underpricing The initial (first-day) return for the IPO. Underpricing is 
calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer 
price to the closing price of the stock on the first day of 
trading. 
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The second return calculation is BHAR, as discussed by Barber and Lyon (1997).  This 
approach examines the difference in monthly returns between the IPO and the market 
(CRSP equally weighted index) return and compounds that difference over a three-year 
time period, measuring the three-year compounded abnormal return.  These two stock 
return measures are calculated both before and after the lock-up period.  The final stock 
return calculation is a calendar time approach, which regresses the excess monthly 
returns (monthly return minus risk free rate) for a time-based portfolio of IPO firms on 
the Fama and French (1993) three factors.  The constant (alpha) of the regression 
measures the abnormal performance for the sample. 
4.2 Accounting Performance 
Due to the documented troubles with long-term stock returns, other variables will 
be used to measure long-run performance by VCs.  To capture the financial performance 
of VCs, accounting variables will be implemented.  The different accounting variables 
used will be ROA (net income divided by assets), cash flow per assets, and sales per 
assets.  These variables will estimate the efficiency of the two types of IPO firms.  The 
accounting performance should be higher for VC-backed IPOs if VCs improve the 
financial performance over that of non-VC-backed IPOs.       
4.3 Access to Capital 
 It is hypothesized in this paper that VCs will increase firms access to capital 
markets.  The first variable that estimates the firms ability to raise capital is the KZ 
Index.  The KZ Index measures the financial constraint level of firms.  Higher KZ scores 
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equal higher levels of financial constraint and visa versa.21  The KZ index has been 
winzorized at the top and bottom 1% level due to extremely large KZ scores at the top 
and bottom of the data, which lowers the total sample to 1,438 total IPOs.  The second 
variable that measures access to capital is a financial constraint dummy variable.  This 
variable classifies a firm as financially constrained based on having KZ scores in the 
highest one-third of the sample.  Using a dummy variable eliminates the need to 
winzorize the data and increases the sample back to 1,466 as the KZ scores simply take a 
value of either zero (not financially constrained) or one (financially constrained).  Debt 
ratio is also shown as a measure of firm level financial constraint by Whited (1992).  
Debt ratio is measured as the total amount of debt divided by total assets.    
4.4 Governance 
It is hypothesized in this paper that VCs will help improve the long-run 
governance of the firm through board involvement.  The variables used to measure the 
governance of these firms are the Gompers, Ishy, and Metric (2003) G-Index, the 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) E-Index, and abnormal accruals.  The G-index 
measures the level of shareholder rights for a firm.  As the G-number for the firm 
increases, governance for that firm decreases.  VC-backed IPOs should have significantly 
lower G-scores as compared to non-VC backed IPOs if this hypothesis is correct.  The E-
index measures the level of managerial entrenchment, and follows the same pattern.  
Abnormal accruals are used to measure the earnings quality if the firm.  Firms with better 
                                                
21 The KZ Index measures constraints based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and classify firms according to 
this measure (known as the KZ Index).  Specifically, following Lamont et al. (2001), construct an index of 
the likelihood that a firm faces financial constraints by applying the following columnarization to the data: 
KZ Index = -1.002*CashFlow + 0.283*Q + 3.130*Leverage  39.368*Dividends  1.315*CashHoldings  
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governance should also have higher quality earnings, and thus less abnormal accruals.  
Abnormal accruals are calculated based on the method used by Larker, Richardson, and 
Tuna (2006) in which total accruals are regressed against several factors to control for the 
normal portion and the residual is the abnormal portion of accruals.22 
4.5 Individual IPO characteristics 
This section discusses the variables used to identify the characteristics of the 
different firms at the time of their IPO.  VC (the primary variable of interest) will be a 
dummy variable that measures whether or not the IPO firm had venture funding at the 
time of the IPO.  The next variable used is offer price.  Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and 
Spindt (2002) find a positive relationship between offer prices and long-run returns.  Log 
age is the natural log of the age of the firm at the time of the IPO, controlling for the 
stability and risk of the firm.  Log assets are the natural log of the firms assets at the time 
of the IPO, controlling for the size of the IPO.   
Prestigious underwriter variable is a dummy variable that measures whether or 
not the firm used a prestigious underwriter for the IPO.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1994) argue that investors use the investment banks past performance, as measured by 
the quality of firms in which they previously sold equity, to enhance their creditability. 
Underwriters who sell equity in firms with better long-run performance will build their 
reputation.  Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) examine this theory and find that the long-run 
performance of IPOs is positively affected by the reputation of the underwriter.  Houge, 
et al. (2001) argue that flipping affects long-run performance.  To control for this issue, 
                                                
22 The regression used in Larker, Richardson, and Tuna (2006) is as follows: TA = ά + B1(∆Sales- ∆REC) 
+ B2PPE + B3BM + B4CFO + e 
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underpricing will be used.  Underpricing is measured as the change in price on the first-
day of trading (offer date) for the IPO.  This variable will identify if underpricing affects 
long-run performance.  The IPO characteristics will be used to control for the differences 
in the firms at the time of the IPO.   
 
5. Results 
  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 This section describes the difference in means between venture and non-venture 
backed IPOs.  Table 12 displays the mean and number of observation for the entire 
sample as well as the subsample of both venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs.  
Also shown are the differences between the two groups of IPOs and the significance of 
those differences.  Panel A examines the means and differences in means between the 
venture backed and non-venture back samples at the time of the IPO.  For the sample of 
1,466 IPO firms, 46.5% of the IPO firms have venture capital funding.  The average 
characteristics for the entire sample of IPO firms are 109 million in total assets, 
underpricing of 23.7%, firm age of about 14 years, offer price of $12.21, and underwriter 
grade of 7.38.  As mentioned, panel A also looks at the difference between the two types 
of IPOs.  The difference between the two groups shows that total assets and firm age are 
significantly greater for non-venture backed IPOs, while underpricing, offer price, and 
underwriter grade are significantly greater for venture backed IPOs.  The amount of 
proceeds is insignificantly larger for the venture sample.  The significant differences 
between the IPO characteristics illustrate the major differences between the two types of 
IPOs.             
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Table 12 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of 1,466 IPOs (1990-2000) 
This table looks at the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, IPOs with no venture backing, and IPOs 
with venture backing.    Table 1 defines all of the variables shown in the descriptive statistics.  Difference is 
defined as the sample of non-venture backed IPOs subtracted by venture backed IPOs.  Mean significance 
tests were ran on the difference between the two samples to test if they were significantly different from 
zero.  P-values from these tests are shown in the last column. 
 
Panel A: Time of the IPO         
Variable Full Sample No Venture Venture Difference P-value 
Number of IPOs 1466 769 697 72  
Total Assets 109.01 116.33 100.93 15.40 0.02 
Underpricing 0.237 0.160 0.321 -0.161 0.00 
Proceeds 42.27 40.90 43.78 -2.88 0.20 
Age 14.20 17.43 10.64 6.79 0.00 
Offer Price 12.21 11.75 12.71 -0.952 0.00 
Underwriter Grade 7.38 6.86 7.95 -1.09 0.00 
      
Panel B: Three Years After the IPO         
Variable Full Sample No Venture Venture Difference P-value 
Three-year returns 
(180-Days) 0.123 0.118 0.128 -0.010 0.76 
Three-year returns 0.288 0.247 0.333 -0.086 0.41 
Total Assets 160.82 178.55 141.25 37.31 0.00 
Sales 150.80 179.48 119.16 60.32 0.00 
ROA -0.078 -0.025 -0.136 0.111 0.00 
Cash Flow / Assets -0.023 0.027 -0.078 0.105 0.00 
Sales / Assets 1.08 1.24 0.893 0.352 0.00 
KZ Index -5.49 -3.47 -7.71 4.24 0.00 
Financial Constraint 0.323 0.404 0.232 0.172 0.00 
Debt / Asset 0.173 0.225 0.114 0.111 0.00 
Total Accruals 8.47 6.86 10.26 -3.40 0.01 
Abnormal Accruals -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 0.14 
G-Index 7.37 7.49 7.27 0.225 0.32 
E-Index 1.91 1.92 1.90 0.021 0.87 
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 Panel B of table 12 shows the means for the entire sample and the breakdown of 
venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs for different measures three years after the 
IPO.  First shown is the compounded return for a period of six months and a period of 
three years after the IPO date.  Although the compounded return for venture backed IPOs 
is larger for both the six-month period and the three-year period, neither difference is 
significantly different from zero.  The next items shown are size measures of the firm.  
Total assets and sales are significantly larger for the non-venture backed sample, showing 
that the average size is larger for non-VC-backed IPOs.  The next three variables examine 
the accounting performance for both IPO groups.  The non-venture backed group has 
accounting performance ratios of 2.5%, 2.7%, and 124%, respectively, for ROA, cash 
flow per assets, and sales per assets, while the venture backed group has comparable 
performance ratios of -13.6%, -7.8%, and 89.3%.  The difference between all three 
accounting measures of financial performance point out that the sample of non-venture 
backed IPOs greatly outperforms that of venture backed sample in terms of these 
accounting measures.  This evidence is intriguing as the result appears to contradict that 
of Jain and Kini (1995), and also counters the implications of Brav and Gompers (1997) 
and Hellman and Puri (2002).  This result might capture the fact that IPOs backed by 
VCs during this sample period focuses more on growth than financial performance.  
 The next three variables measure access to capital. The first is the KZ index.  The 
sample is slightly smaller with a total sample of 1,438 IPOs as it has been winzorized at 
the top and bottom 1% level.  The comparison of the KZ index shows that venture backed 
IPOs have significantly lower KZ scores than non-venture backed IPOs.  This leads to a 
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lower level of financial constraint and thus better access to capital for VC-backed IPO 
firms.  The second variable that measures access to capital is the financial constraint 
dummy, which classifies a firm as financially constrained based on having KZ scores in 
the highest third (higher KZ scores equal more constrained firms).  Using a dummy 
variable eliminates the need to winzorize the data and increases the sample back to 1,466.  
Venture backed IPOs have a 17.2% less firms that are considered financially constrained 
by this measure as compared to non-venture backed firms.  The third measure examined 
is the firms debt-to-asset ratio.  Venture backed IPOs have a significantly lower debt 
ratio.  All three measures share the same result that venture backed IPOs are significantly 
less financially constrained than non-venture backed IPOs.  This result is consistent with 
the common belief that VCs increase the firms ability to access capital markets.                     
 The final three variables examine VCs effect on firm governance.  First, G-index 
and E-index are measured.  As mentioned above the problems with the first two variables 
are the reduced number of observations. Both of these variables show venture backed 
IPOs with a better governance (lower G and E index values indicating better governance), 
but the difference between the two are insignificant.  Another measure used to examine 
governance is abnormal accruals.  This variable eliminates the concern of a smaller 
sample with the other two variables.  By construction, both numbers for abnormal 
accruals are extremely low.  The abnormal accruals are marginally smaller for venture 
backed IPOs than non-venture backed IPOs, suggesting that the VCs may improve 
governance. 
5.2 Regression Results 
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Table 13 
Calendar-Time Returns 
This table looks at the calendar time returns and regress the returns against both the market-model (RMRF) 
and the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model (RMRF, SMB, HML).  The P-values are shown in 
parentheses.  
   
Panel A: Full Sample                              Market Model FF 3-Factor Model 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept (alpha) -0.0018 -0.0022 
 (0.24) (0.14) 
RMRF 1.5902 1.4327 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
SMB  0.7157 
  (0.00) 
HML  -0.2438 
    (0.00) 
   
Panel B: No Venture Sample                 Market Model FF 3-Factor Model 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept (alpha) -0.0028 -0.0020 
 (0.12) (0.10) 
RMRF 1.2839 1.2067 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
SMB  0.7724 
  (0.00) 
HML  -0.1829 
    (0.00) 
   
Panel C: Venture Sample                      Market Model FF 3-Factor Model 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept (alpha) 0.0010 -0.0007 
 (0.62) (0.86) 
RMRF 1.8795 1.5640 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
SMB  0.6863 
  (0.00) 
HML  -0.4821 
    (0.00) 
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 This section will explain the various regression results of the paper.  Table 13 
shows the results from a time series regression using the calendar time approach (Fama 
and French, 1998) and regresses the time-based portfolio of returns against a market 
factor and the Fama-French three-factor model.  Panel A examines the entire sample of 
1,466 firms.  The results for both models show that the abnormal performance by IPOs 
appears to be non-existent for the full sample using the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model.  Panel B examines the abnormal returns for the non-venture backed sample 
with 769 IPOs.  The results from the time series regressions show that the non-venture 
sample has marginal underperformance for the time period.  These results agree with the 
results from Brav and Gompers (1997) who find underperformance in the non-venture 
IPO sample.  Panel C examines the 697 IPO venture backed sample.  The results show 
that venture samples alpha is insignificant, meaning no significant under- or over-
performance based on the market model or the Fama-French three-factor model.  This 
result is slightly different from Brav and Gompers (1997) who show a marginally 
significant positive alpha for the venture sample.            
 Table 14 examines the BHARs for the venture and non-venture samples.  The 
table measures whether VC-backed IPOs have higher BHARs than non-venture backed 
IPOs.  Both the BHAR for 180 days after the IPO and three years after the IPO are 
insignificant.  For the three-year BHAR, only log size is significant, meaning larger size 
IPOs have larger BHAR.  Log age and log proceeds are marginally significant and have 
the expected sign.  All the other variables are insignificant.   
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Table 14 
 
Three-Year Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
This table examines the buy-and-hold returns for the sample of 1,466 IPOs.  Buy-and-hold returns are 
calculated as the monthly returns minus the reference portfolio (CRSP equal-weighted index) and then 
compounded for the thirty-six period after the IPO.  The period begins one month after the IPO as to not 
confound the performance with the initial return from the IPO.  The buy-hold-return for 180-days is based 
upon the 180-days not counting the first-day return.  Table 1 defines all of the variables used in the 
regressions.  The P-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
Dependant Variable Buy-and-hold return Buy-and-hold return 180 
 (1) (2) 
VC Funding Dummy 0.034 -0.025 
 (0.58) (0.43) 
Log Age -0.052 -0.042 
 (0.09) (0.01) 
Offer Price 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.79) (0.10) 
Prestigious UW Dummy 0.095 0.089 
 (0.17) (0.01) 
Log Proceeds -0.130 -0.142 
 (0.08) (0.00) 
Underpricing -0.026 -0.100 
 (0.73) (0.01) 
Log Size 0.101 0.147 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Constant -0.610 -0.960 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
   
Adj. R-squared 0.018 0.054 
Observations 1466 1466 
 
The regression examining the time period of only 180-days has similar results but now 
the prestigious underwriters dummy and underpricing are significant.  The adjusted R-
squared on the regression is low at only 1.8%.         
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Table 15 
 
Compounded Returns 
This table examines the buy-and-hold returns for the sample of 1,466 IPOs.  Three-year returns are 
calculated as the monthly compounded returns for the thirty-six period after the IPO.  The period begins 
one month after the IPO as to not confound the performance with the initial return from the IPO.  The buy-
hold-return for 180-days is based upon the 180-days not counting the first-day return.  Table 1 defines all of 
the variables used in the regressions.  The P-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
Dependant Variable 3-Year Return 180-Day Return 
 (1) (2) 
VC Funding Dummy 0.064 -0.014 
 (0.59) (0.71) 
Log Age -0.106 -0.050 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
Offer Price 0.015 -0.012 
 (0.45) (0.07) 
Prestigious UW Dummy 0.188 0.090 
 (0.17) (0.03) 
Log Proceeds -0.299 -0.174 
 (0.03) (0.00) 
Underpricing -0.077 -0.099 
 (0.58) 0.024 
Industry Return (Equal) 0.772 0.180 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Size 0.230 0.288 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Constant -1.645 -0.742 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
   
Adj. R-squared 0.043 0.109 
 
Observations 1466 1466 
 
 Table 15 measures how VCs affect the long-run performance in terms of 
compounded three-year returns.  The results show that VCs appear to increase the three-
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year return, but it is an insignificant amount.  Also shown on this table are the buy-and-
hold returns for the first six-month period measuring the lock-up period.  The results 
from table 15 are similar to those from table 14 for the independent variables.  Log age, 
log proceeds, and log size are significant again.  For the shorter time period, both 
prestigious underwriter and underpricing once again matter.  Different from table 14, an 
industry return control variable (CRSP equal-weighted return) is added to the regression.  
Tables 13, 14, and 15 illustrate the difficult and confusion of using returns to ascertain 
the difference in long-run performance.   
 To further explore the issue of long-run performance, accounting measures will be 
examined for both IPO types.  The three measures used to examine financial performance 
are return on assets, cash flow per assets, and sales per assets.  Table 16 examines these 
measures using a multivariate regression analysis.  Columns (1) and (2) use ROA as the 
dependent variable in the regression.  The result from column (1) demonstrates that VCs 
reduce financial performance as the coefficient for the VC dummy is significant with -
5%, meaning that venture backed IPOs have 5 percentage points lower ROA than non-
VC-backed IPOs after controlling for various measures.  This result contradicts the idea 
that VCs should improve the financial performance of IPOs, and is opposite to the results 
of Jain and Kini (1995).  Perhaps, this result is due to a differing role that VCs have taken 
over time, which coincides with the underpricing results from Lee and Wahal (2004) and 
Flagg (2007).  The coefficient for log age is positive and significant, demonstrating that 
older firms appear to have better financial success in term of ROA than younger firms.   
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Table 16 
 
Accounting Performance 
This table examines the accounting performance for the sample of 1,466 IPOs.  Table 1 defines all of the 
variables used in the regressions.  The P-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
Dependant Variable ROA CF/TA Sales/TA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
VC Dummy -0.050 -0.034 -0.048 -0.032 -0.132 -0.054 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) 
Log Age 0.032 0.020 0.030 0.017 0.093 0.016 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.35) 
Offer Price 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.11) (0.76) (0.66) 
Prestigious UW -0.025 -0.006 -0.019 -0.001 -0.066 -0.044 
 (0.14) (0.68) (0.22) (0.95) (0.13) (0.23) 
Log Proceeds -0.028 0.001 -0.027 0.002 -0.032 0.009 
 (0.10) (0.97) (0.09) (0.87) (0.47) (0.82) 
Underpricing -0.067 -0.057 -0.045 -0.035 -0.098 -0.029 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.45) 
Log Size 0.047 0.014 0.048 0.014 -0.027 -0.073 
 (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.11) (0.32) (0.00) 
ROA (beginning)  0.421       
  (0.00)       
CF/TA (beginning)     0.429    
     (0.00)    
Sales/TA (beginning)        1.182 
        (0.00) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -0.236 -0.181 -0.177 -0.132 1.477 0.462 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
         
Adj. R-squared 0.208 0.299 0.221 0.329 0.350 0.518 
 
Observations 1466 1466 1466 1466 1466 1466 
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 The coefficient for offer price is positive and significant as a higher offer price 
(initial value of an IPO) is positively related to future ROA.  This is consistent with 
results in Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (2002).  The coefficient for the 
prestigious underwriter dummy variable is insignificant.  The coefficient for log proceeds 
is negative and marginally significant as higher proceeds at the time of the IPO leads to 
lower ROA.  Underpricing is negative and significant as the first-day return for the IPO, 
which is typically driven by asymmetric information and risk leads to lower ROA.  The 
coefficient for log size is positive and significant, demonstrating that a larger firm size at 
the time of the IPO leads to a higher future ROA.  This agrees with the logic that 
underpricing measures higher risk, asymmetric information, and potential flipping 
(Houge, et al., 2001) and will lead to a lower ROA on average.  The adjusted R-squared 
of the regression is 20.8%, much higher than that in the return regressions.   
 One issue with measuring ROA three years after the IPO is that perhaps the 
results are driven by the ROA of the firm at the time of the IPO.   In other words, good 
performing firms continue to do well while poor performing firms continue to do poorly.  
Column (2) of table 16 adds the ROA of the IPO firm at the time of the IPO.  The 
addition of this variable provides a way to gauge whether the significant difference in 
ROA between venture backed IPOs and non-venture backed IPOs is simply a function of 
prior firm characteristics.  This variable as expected is positive and significant as a high 
prior ROA leads to a high future ROA and visa versa.  Even after controlling for the 
initial ROA, the VC dummy variable coefficient still remains negative and significant.  
This evidence strongly indicates that VCs appear to lower financial performance of the 
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firm.  Is it possible that the above phenomenon is due to the reduced interest of VCs after 
the IPO and lock-up period?  There are no major changes in the magnitude and 
significance of any other variable in the regression with the exception of log size, which 
becomes insignificant, possibly because size at the time of IPO partially controlled for the 
ROA at the time of the IPO.       
 In order to test the robustness of using ROA to capture financial performance, two 
additional dependent variables are used.   Columns (3) and (4) use cash flow divided by 
total assets as the dependent variable.  The results are basically the same. ROA with 
venture funding is negatively related to the firms percentage of cash flow per assets.  All 
control variables have similar magnitudes and significance as shown before.  Again, cash 
flow per assets at the time of the IPO is controlled for and there is no loss to the primary 
result.  The final dependent variable used is sales per assets, shown in columns (4) and 
(5).  The VC variable is negative and significant once again using this measure for 
financial performance, demonstrating the reduced accounting performance by VC-backed 
IPOs.  There are no major changes to any of the control variables in terms of magnitude 
and significance using this measure.   
 The next area examined in this paper is access to capital.  The first dependent 
variable used to measure firms access to capital is the KZ-index, which measures the 
constraint level of a firm.  Table 17 illustrates VCs influence on the access to capital for 
IPO firms.  The smaller sample size of this first regression is due to the fact that the KZ-
index variable was winzorized at the 1% and 99% level, eliminating the lowest and 
highest 1% because of extreme values on these sides.   
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Table 17 
 
Access to Capital 
This table examines the access to capital for the sample of 1,466 IPOs.   Table 1 defines all of the variables 
used in the regressions.  The P-values are shown in parentheses.  Columns (2) and (3) are probit regressions 
since the dependant variable is a dummy variable. 
 
 
Dependant 
Variable 
KZ 
Index 
Financially 
Constrained 
Financially 
Unconstrained  
Debt 
Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VC Dummy -1.665 -0.173 0.516 -0.035 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Age 0.475 -0.016 -0.130 -0.008 
 (0.19) (0.70) (0.01) (0.18) 
Offer Price -0.129 -0.030 0.029 -0.009 
 (0.30) (0.06) (0.04) (0.00) 
Prestigious UW -1.590 -0.021 0.199 -0.053 
 (0.05) (0.83) (0.03) (0.00) 
Log Proceeds 1.424 0.089 -0.221 -0.010 
 (0.05) (0.31) (0.01) (0.46) 
Underpricing -1.143 -0.231 0.134 -0.026 
 (0.18) (0.10) (0.15) (0.05) 
 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -2.697 -0.256 -0.376 0.117 
 (0.36) (0.72) (0.20) (0.01) 
         
Adj. R-squared 0.104 0.148 0.152 0.282 
         
Observations 1438 1466 1466 1466 
 
 The results for the KZ index are shown in column (1) of table 17.  The coefficient 
for the VC dummy variable is negative and significant, showing that the presence of a 
VCs reduces the constraint level of a firm and thus providing a better future access to 
capital for VC-backed IPOs.  The coefficient for the prestigious underwriter dummy 
variable is also negatively significant to the KZ-index.  Having a prestigious underwriter 
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reduces the financial constraint level of firms.  Log proceeds are also significant, but have 
a positive coefficient as firms that raise more proceeds at the time of the IPO are more 
financially constrained based on the KZ index.   Firm age, offer price, and underpricing 
are insignificant to the KZ-index.  The adjusted R-squared for the regression is 10.4%.   
 To avoid the loss of observations with extreme upper and lower values of the KZ 
index, a dummy variable was created for financial constraint.  The dependent variable in 
column (2) is a dummy variable measuring financial constraint firms (based on the KZ 
index).  Since a dummy variable is used as the dependent variable a probit model is used 
for column (2).  The coefficient for the VC dummy variable is negative and significant, 
showing that venture funding at the time of the IPO reduces the probability that a firm 
will be financially constraint.  This result agrees with those from column (1) using the 
raw KZ index.  One major difference from the results in column (1) concerns prestigious 
underwriters.  Now, the coefficient for prestigious underwriters is insignificant.  Column 
(3) looks at the other side of the picture by constructing a dummy variable for the firms 
that are the least financially constrained.  Once again a probit model is used for this 
regression.  The coefficient for the VC dummy variable has a positive and significant 
coefficient, showing that venture funding increases the probability that the firm will be 
financially unconstrained or the firm will have less fictions accessing the capital markets.  
This confirms the results from column (1) using the KZ index and shows that IPOs with 
prestigious underwriters are more likely to be financially unconstrained.     
 Column (4) uses a different variable to measure IPO firms access to capital, the 
ratio of debt to assets.  As with the other measures for access to capital, the VC dummy 
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variable has a negative and significant coefficient. This variable shows that VC-backed 
IPOs have significantly lower debt to asset ratios as compared to non-VC-backed IPOs 
after controlling for risk and industry.  This result supports those from the KZ measure.  
Offer price, prestigious underwriters, and underpricing reduce the debt to asset ratio of 
IPO firms.  The other variables used in the regression are insignificant.      
 The final issue examined is the governance of IPOs firms.  The results for 
governance are shown in table 18.  The first measure used is the Gompers, Ishy, and 
Metric (2002) G-index.  The total sample size of this is reduced as G-index scores are 
limited for newly public firms.  The total sample size of this regression is only 387 
observations.  VCs influence in the governance of an IPO using the G-index as a 
measure is inconclusive as the VC dummy variable for this regression is positive but 
insignificant.  Interesting in this regression is the fact that the coefficient for prestigious 
underwriter dummy variable is negative and significant.  Prestigious underwriters seem to 
improve the governance of IPO firms according to the G-index.  The other IPO 
characteristics have insignificant results.  It is difficult to infer much out of this 
regression due to the small sample size.  Column (2) uses the E-Index as a measure for 
governance, and suffers from the same lack of data as the G-index.  The sample size for 
this is only 366 total observations.  The result with the E-index is similar to that of the G-
index as the coefficient for the VC dummy variable is insignificant.  Once again, the 
coefficient for prestigious underwriter dummy variable is negative and significant.  For 
the small sample, it appears that a prestigious underwriter has some influence on future 
governance of the firm. 
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  Table 18 
 
Governance 
This table examines governance for the sample of 1,466 IPOs.  G-Index and E-Index do not have a full 
sample due to limited data for these two indexes for newly formed public firms.  Table 1 defines all of the 
variables used in the regressions.  The P-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
Dependant Variable G-Index E-index Abnormal Accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VC Dummy 0.097 0.136 -0.00037 
 (0.70) (0.37) (0.03) 
Log Age -0.054 0.056 0.00000 
 (0.70) (0.50) (0.99) 
Offer Price -0.002 0.022 -0.00004 
 (0.95) (0.29) (0.12) 
Prestigious UW  -0.771 -0.455 -0.00001 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.96) 
Log Proceeds 0.412 0.068 0.00007 
 (0.14) (0.68) (0.71) 
Underpricing -0.143 -0.116 0.00016 
 (0.57) (0.43) (0.41) 
Log Size -0.053 -0.068 0.00022 
 (0.78) (0.55) (0.05) 
       
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 4.461 1.350 -0.00185 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
       
Adj. R-squared 0.094 0.070 0.040 
 
Observations 387 366 1466 
 
 The final variable used is abnormal accruals.  As mentioned earlier, Larker, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2006) argue that the G-index does not fully capture the variables 
that reflect poor governance.  With this in mind, abnormal accruals are used to measure 
poor governance.  The coefficient for the VC dummy variable has a negative and 
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significant coefficient.  It appears that VCs reduce the amount of abnormal accruals made 
by IPO firms, showing less earnings management by VC-backed IPOs and perhaps better 
governance.  In general, however, the governance results are mixed as G-index and E-
index produce non-significant results.     
  Table 19 examines the ability of the accounting and access to capital variables to 
explain the cross-sectional differences in the three-year returns for different types of 
IPOs.  The ability of a governance variable to affect the long-run returns is eliminated 
from this analysis due to the reduced number of observations of governance variables and 
the mixed results.  To see how the accounting and access to capital variables will affect 
the three-year compounded return, ex ante variables are used for these measures.   
Column (1) uses ROA for the firm at the time of IPO to predict future returns.  As shown 
in table 16, previous ROA, known at the time of the IPO, is positively related to future 
ROA.  The coefficient for the beginning ROA variable is positive and significantly 
related to the three-year return.  This illustrates that a higher (lower) ROA at the time of 
the IPO leads to a higher (lower) three-year return on average.  Column (2) does the same 
thing for financial constraint.  Since it is difficult to measure if a firm is financially 
constraint at the time of the IPO, the estimated probability that a firm will be financially 
constraint in the future is used based on the probit model from table 17s column (2).  
The coefficient for this variable is negative and significant.  This illustrates that these 
firms are more likely to be financially constraint will have lower three-year compounded 
returns on average. 
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Table 19 
 
Three-Year Returns  
This table examines the buy-and-hold returns for the sample of 1,466 IPOs.  Three-year returns are 
calculated as the monthly compounded returns for the thirty-six period after the IPO.  The period begins 
one month after the IPO as to not confound the performance with the initial return from the IPO.  Table 1 
defines all of the variables used in the regressions.  The P-values are shown in parentheses.  ROA 
(beginning) is the ROA for the firm at the time of the IPO.  Prob. of Fin Constraint is the probability that 
the firm will be considered financially constrained three years in the future.  
 
Dependant Variable: Three Year Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VC Funding Dummy 0.085 -0.256 -0.215 
 (0.47) (0.17) (0.26) 
Log Age -0.123 -0.112 -0.127 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
Offer Price 0.010 -0.047 -0.047 
 (0.61) (0.18) (0.18) 
Prestigious UW Dummy 0.212 0.146 0.171 
 (0.12) (0.28) (0.21) 
Log Proceeds -0.258 -0.096 -0.073 
 (0.07) (0.57) (0.68) 
Underpricing -0.065 0.020 0.025 
 (0.65) (0.89) (0.87) 
Industry Return (Equal) 0.755 0.745 0.730 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Size 0.186 0.227 0.186 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
ROA (beginning) 0.565  0.524 
 (0.04)  (0.05) 
Prob. of Fin Constraint  -5.808 -5.418 
  (0.03) (0.04) 
    
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant -1.520 0.934 0.876 
 (0.04) (0.50) (0.52) 
 
Adj. R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.048 
    
Observations 1466 1466 1466 
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 Column (3) includes both ex ante variables, ROA at the time of IPO for the firm 
and the estimated probability of the IPO firm to be financially constraint.  Both of the 
variables have approximately the same size and magnitude as displayed in columns (1) 
and (2) of table 19.  The result from this table shows two different things.  First, it 
suggests a potential explanation for the varied results found in the long-term studies on 
VCs, as VC-backed IPOs appear to have worse accounting-based financial performance 
but do seem to improve the newly public firms ability to raise capital.  Since both factors 
affect the long-run return of IPOs but in opposite directions, it is therefore not surprising 
that the overall effect is ambiguous in general and depends on different time periods, 
methodologies, and sub samples used.  Also shown here is the ability of ex ante variables 
to predict the future three-year compounded return of IPO firms.             
 Table 20 is a robustness check that eliminates the bubble period from the sample.  
Perhaps, the bubble period causes varying IPO long-run performance.  Extreme 
underpricing and quality of firms going public during the bubble period might influence 
the results.  The burst of the bubble could also lead to extreme poor performance for 
especially IPOs backed by VCs which have a higher concentration of IPOs during the 
bubble period.  With those factors in mind, IPOs with offer dates inside the bubble period 
have been eliminated.  The results from tables 14, 15, 16, and 17 have been recalculated 
with the sample of 1,220 IPOs that have offer dates outside of the bubble period.  The 
primary variable of interestthe coefficient of the VC dummy variabledoes not 
change when using the smaller non-bubble sample.   
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Table 20 
 
Elimination of the Bubble Period 
This table examines the results from previous tables using a sub sample of 1,220 IPOs that do not include 
the bubble period.  Table 1 defines all of the variables used in the regressions.  The P-values are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
 
Dependant Variable ROA 3-Year Return 3-Year BHAR KZ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VC Dummy -0.037 0.136 0.080 -2.190 
 (0.00) (0.33) -0.270 (0.00) 
Log Age 0.028 -0.126 -0.061 0.454 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.09) (0.19) 
Offer Price 0.009 0.012 0.001 -0.012 
 (0.00) (0.65) (0.94) (0.93) 
Prestigious UW Dummy -0.024 0.183 0.089 -1.376 
 (0.14) (0.25) (0.27) (0.08) 
Log Proceeds -0.037 -0.359 -0.163 -1.127 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.19) 
Underpricing -0.026 0.785 0.533 -5.099 
 (0.42) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Size 0.052 0.278 0.127 1.782 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Industry Return (Equal)  0.748   
  (0.00)   
     
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.245 -1.702 -0.685 -2.566 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.35) 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.205 0.022 0.023 0.135 
 
Observations 1220 1220 1220 1200 
 
Interesting is that underpricing, which was insignificant for returns and access to capital, 
is now significant outside the bubble period.  That is, beyond the bubble, higher 
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underpricing (first-day return) appears to lead to higher returns and less financially 
constrained firms.        
 
6. Conclusion 
 It is widely believed that VCs should help improve the long-run performance of 
IPOs that they take an equity stake in. Unfortunately, extant empirical results supporting 
this belief are generally inconclusive and have left much to be desired.  In an attempt to 
bridge this gap, this chapter examines the role of VCs in the long-run performance of 
IPOs, and hopes to provide evidence that helps shed light on the role of VCs.  The paper 
finds that the long-run benefits are indeed mixed with respect to the long-run return for 
VC-backed IPO firms. VCs appear to improve IPO firms access to capital, but they also 
impede the firms financial performance as calculated by accounting measures.  
Together, these results help explain why long-run return studies on VCs are generally 
inconclusive.  Finally, this paper shows that accounting and access to capital variables 
have explanatory power in the cross section of IPO returns.  
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